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I. Kicking the Can Down the Road
It may not be clear for some time, however, whether Doha has really set multilateral trade
policy firmly back on track....
Agreement was reached by dint of vague drafting compromises that often merely papered
over divergent national interests. The consequence is a negotiating agenda riddled with am-
biguity. Not surprisingly, government with directly conificting objectives have proclaimed vic-
tory with equal conviction.'
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1. Guy de Jonqui~res, New Battles Loom After WTO Success at Doba, FIN. TIMEs (Survey: 2002 and Beyond),
Feb. 1, 2002, at Ill.
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A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
This article questions the conventional wisdom on the recent and possibly seminal event
in international trade law 2-the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) held at Doha, Qatar from November 9-13, 2001. The conventional
wisdom is that the Doha Conference was a "success."3 Because of two unmet challenges
that concern the Third World and the Muslim World, the conventional wisdom may be
wrong-or, at least, giddy.
The post-Doha squabble over who ought to serve as the Chairman of the Trade Nego-
tiations Committee (TNC), which was established to handle the task of supervising the
new trade round launched at the Conference, should have been a clue that all might not
be well. 4 Some developed countries, like the United States, wanted the Director-General,
Mike Moore, to serve as the TNC Chairman. Other VWTO members, especially developing
countries, preferred to select the Chairman from the ranks of trade ambassadors based in
Geneva, apparently to better control the new round than if the Director-General were
running matters. Hard feelings also remained after Doha. Some developing countries felt
the Director-General had declined to push hard enough at Doha for a "development box"
on their use of agricultural subsidies and on special tariff treatment for their exports. The
likely result? A compromise whereby the Director-General-elect (who is Thailand's Dr.
Supachai Panitchpakdi, effective September 1, 2002) serves as Chairman ex officio and the
TNC reports to the VTO's General Council, which is member-driven and attended by
Geneva-based trade ambassadors.'
This post-Doha clue about the accuracy of the conventional wisdom seems to have gone
unnoticed amidst the euphoria immediately following, and continuing well after, the Con-
ference. "This has been a hell of a good week for the WTO," said the European Union's
(EU) Trade Commissioner--after complaining repeatedly that, "We [the EU] have got
nothing. We are the orphans of the WTO."7 The rosy conclusion about Doha is based not
so much on the accession of China and Taiwan (though the end of their long road to
membership certainly was good news), and certainly not on the waiver granted to African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries for receipt of preferential trade benefits from the EU, as
on the agreement of an agenda for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.' The
sanguineness, urged by the WTO Director-General extends to developing countries, be-
cause the new round should benefit these countries.9
2. For an abridged, two-part version of the article, see Raj Bhala, The Third World, The Muslim Worg and
the New Trade Round (Part One), 8 INT'L TaDzE L. & REG. (2002) and The Third Worl, The Muslim World, and
the New Trade Round (Part Two), 8 IN'L TRADE L. & REG. (2002). For a modified single version, see Raj Bhala,
Challenges of Poverty and Islam Facing American Trade Law, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. (Symposium on
"Globalization's Impact on International Trade and Intellectual Property Law," forthcoming 2002).
3. See, e.g., Moiges Nafm, Lessonsfrom the Recent Past, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at 11 (writing that "the
outcome of the WTO summit in Doha far exceeded expectations"); Michael Mann, Fiseber Hails Doha Meeting
a Success, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2001, at 7 (quoting Franz Fischler, European Union Agriculture Commissioner).
4. See Daniel Pruzin, Zoellick Voices Support at WfO for Director-General as TNC Chair, 19 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 111-12 (Jan. 24, 2002).
5. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO members Edge Toward Agreement on Chair to Head Doha Round Committee, 19
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 179-180 (Jan. 31, 2002).
6. Guy deJonquires, WTO ReachesAgreement to Launch New Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1.
7. Guy de Jonqui~res, All-Night Haggling in Doha Ends in Agreement, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 6.
8. See, e.g., Beyond Doha, EcONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2001, at 11 (proclaiming "At least they struck a deal").
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So, while not every day in Doha went swimmingly, 0 the end result was a triumph-the
"Doha Development Agenda" (DDA). The new round is scheduled to last three years,
starting after the Fifth Ministerial Conference, in Mexico City in 2003 and ending January
1, 2005.
B. THE DDA
The DDA includes a large number of items, most notably those listed below." The
negotiations on these items are to be conducted as a single undertaking; hence no accord
in any sector will be final until agreement is reached on all issues. 2
Agricultural Subsidies: Negotiations on "reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms
of export subsidies" for farm products and "substantial reductions in trade-distorting do-
mestic" support schemes, but "without prejudging the outcome" of these talks, while taking
into account the need for Special and Differential (S & D) treatment for underdeveloped
countries. 3
Industrial Products: Negotiations to eliminate or reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, in-
cluding tariff spikes (i.e., peaks) on sensitive products like textiles, with attention to exports
from poor countries. The reduction commitments need not be on a reciprocal basis, so as
to allow for S & D treatment for Third World countries. 4
Services: Continued negotiations on (1) market access for financial, telecommunication,
and transport services, and (2) easing of immigration rules for employing workers on tem-
porary contracts.
Trade Remedies: Negotiations on "clarifying and improving disciplines" on anti-dumping
(AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) rules (including fishing subsidies) as set forth in the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (the Anti-
dumping Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement), but concurrently "preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness
of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives. '" The meaning of instruments
is not entirely clear though the American position appears to be that it refers to the trade
remedy laws of the member countries (e.g., United States AD and CVD rules).' 6 Moreover,
during the negotiations, the United States is likely to insist on disciplines against dumping
and illegal subsidization, as distinct from restraints on AD and CVD measures that combat
these unfair trade practices. 7
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Guy de Jonqui~res & Frances Wiliams, WTO Logjam Continues Over Trade RoundAgenda, FI .
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 6 (chronicling the disputes of the first few days of the Ministerial Conference).
11. The DDA is set forth in Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, Draft Ministerial Declaration,
VW7T/MIN(0l)/DEC/W/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Draft Ministerial Declaration]. Summaries of it are
contained in Daniel Pruzin, Trade Officials Assess Winners, Losers in Aftermath of Doha Ministerial Meeting, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1856 (Nov. 22, 2001); Time to Trade, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, atAI6;
Jonquier s, WTO Reaches Agreement, supra note 6; Jonqui~res, All-Night, supra note 7; Mann, supra note 3;
Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WFO member Nations Agree to Launch Development Round at Tough Talks in
Doha, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1814 (Nov. 15, 2001); Frances Wiliams, Declaration on Patent
Rules Cheers DevelopingNations, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 6.
12. See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 11, at 1814.
13. Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11, IT 13-14.
14. See Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11, 116.
15. Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11, 1 28.
16. See Pruzin, Trade Officials Assess, supra note 11, at 1856.
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Regional Trade Agreements: Negotiations on "clarifying and improving disciplines and
procedures" on customs unions and free trade areas.'
Electronic Commerce: Agreement to extend until the Fifth Ministerial Conference (2003)
a ban (initially imposed at the Second Ministerial Conference in 1998) on imposing tariffs
on certain kinds of electronic commerce.
Intellectual Property:19 A Declaration that developing countries will be immune from chal-
lenge under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) if they seek to obtain medical supplies via compulsory licensing in
order to meet a public health crisis. The Declaration provides that "[t]he Trips agreement
does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health,"
and should be understood and enforced in a way "supportive of WTO members' right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."' °
Geograpbic Indications: Negotiations on the protection of geographical indications of cer-
tain foods (namely, cheese, ham, and rice) and on the establishment of a global system for
registering and notifying geographical indications on wines and spirits, with the possibility
of extending the system to cover other items (such as cheese, ham, and yogurt).
S & D Treatment on Subsidies:2 Agreement on requests for extension of the phasing out
period for export and import substitution subsidies under article 27.4 of the SCM Agree-
ment.
The Four "Singapore Issues": Investment, Competition Policy, Trade Facilitation (i.e., Simpli-
fying Customs Procedures), and Transparency in Government Procurement. Preparatory work to
continue under WTO Working Groups established at the First Ministerial Conference in
Singapore in 1996. Negotiations on the Singapore issues will not commence until after the
Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003 and only if there is an "explicit consensus" to begin
them.22 (Any member could take a position preventing the commencement; for example,
an assurance sought at Doha by India and gained through a statement by the Conference
Chairman, Qatar's Youssef Kamal. 23) Such talks would deal with technical assistance for
and capacity-building in developing countries, in order to assess the effects of alternative
proposals.14
Environment: Negotiations on the (1) relationship between WTO obligations and mul-
tilateral environmental agreements (MEA) (e.g., between TRIPS and the U.N. Convention
17. See Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, US. Makes Concession in WTO Agenda Talks on ClankfingDumping,
Subsidies Agreements, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1819 (Nov. 15, 2001).
18. Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11, 129.
19. See Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, Draft Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(0I)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14,2001) [hereinafter TRIPS Draft Declaration]; GeoffDyer,
Activists See Flaws in Drug Patent Proposal, FIN. TiMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at 7.
20. Williams, supra note 11, at 1.
21. See, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Proposed ProceduresforExtensions UnderArtice
27:4 jor Certain Developing Country members, Communication from the Chairman of the General Council,
G/SCM/W/471/Rev.1 (Nov. 13, 2001); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Gets Applications from 18 Countriesfor Ertended
Deadline for Subsidy Phase-Out, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 47 (Jan. 10, 2002).
22. See Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11, 9t 20, 23, 26; Pruzin, Trade OfficialsAssess, supra note
11, at 1857.
23. See Daniel Pruzin, Moore Warns of "Difflult" Fifth Meeting of WTO in 2003 to Resolve Singapore iues,
18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1895 (Nov. 29, 2001).
24. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Outlines Budget Needs to Support Doha Development Agenda, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1898-99 (Nov. 29, 2001).
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on Biodiversity, or between various WTO obligations and the Cartagena bio-safety pro-
tocol for genetically-modified organisms), (2) information exchange between the WTO
and MEA secretariats, and (3) reduction of trade barriers to environmentally-friendly goods
and services. Possible negotiations, to be decided at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in
2003, on eco-labeling and other environmental matters.
C. Is THE CONVENTIONAL. WISDOM WRONG?
The DDA sounds impressive. But, is the conventional wisdom about it wrong?2" Could
it be that Doha was neither a success nor a monstrous failure? Perhaps what happened was
procrastination hidden under the veil of the DDA, as the Financial Times suggested:
Few vital economic interests were at stake, or tangible commercial gains made, and no bar-
gaining positions irretrievably surrendered.
The Doha talks will not directly affect the wealth of nations or prices paid by consumers.
They were talks about whether to hold further talks on global trade liberalisation, and what
their broad parameters and goals should be.
... IMhe sparring was largely intended to defend national pride, manage political perceptions
and square lobbies and constituencies at home.26
The insinuation is reasonable. A careful read of the DDA list shows settlement of only
two substantive trade law issues: (1) compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals (a break-
through credited to Brazil in its bilateral negotiations with the United States27), though not
on imports of inexpensive copies of patented drugs and (2) S & D treatment under the
SCM Agreement. Surely the intense future negotiations in agriculture, industry, services,
and electronic commerce and the possible blockage of talks on the Singapore issues offset
these resolutions."s
Indeed, starting in 2004, the chance of trade wars over agricultural export subsidies can-
not be dismissed. The "peace clause" in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
ensures that export and domestic support subsidies conforming to the Agreement cannot
be challenged as illegal.29 But, the clause has a sunset date of December 31, 2003. There-
after, cases brought under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU) can be initiated
against these subsidies, the infamous examples of which are the EU's Common Agriculture
Policy (CAP) and some American programs. The round launched at Doha is scheduled to
25. Viewed most charitably to the WTO, the facts can be set aside that some items (namely, agriculture
and services) were part of the built-in agenda leftover from the Uruguay Round, and other items have been on
the agenda since 1996 (i.e., the Singapore issues). Similarly, the Doha negotiators agreed to continue on-going
work on improving and clarifying dispute settlement rules, with a target date of May 2003. See Pruzin &
Yerkey, supra note 11, at 1817.
26. See Jonquiires, All-Night, supra note 7.
27. See id.
28. Cognizant of the risk some developing countries might block negotiations on the Singapore issues, WTO
Director-General Moore has written publicly of his belief that it is in the interests of developing countries to
support these talks. He argues - quite plausibly - that investment rules would help attract FDI, competition
rules would help break up cartels, transparency in procurement would help combat corruption, and trade
facilitation rules would lower export costs. Guy de Jonqui~res, Moore Speaks Out on WTO Rules, FIN. TMES,
Feb. 18, 2002, at 5. See Mike Moore, Development Needs More Than Trade, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at 15.
29. Peace clause, Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.
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finish one year after the peace clause expires, i.e., on January 1, 2005, and even that deadline
already has been cast in doubt as "hopelessly optimistic," 0 especially since the Uruguay
Round took seven years, 1986-1993. Thus, the risk of agricultural trade wars is particularly
high in 2004, assuming there is insufficient progress in the talks to eliminate the subsidies.
Unfortunately, the peace clause issue was hardly discussed at Doha. That raises the ques-
tion of whether procrastination at Doha was inevitable. Arguably, it was, in no small part
because the United States failed to meet two significant challenges in international trade
law. Each failure stemmed from miscalculation wrought by inability to see the world trading
system and its legal regime through the eyes of developing and Islamic countries. When
the leading trade power on earth errs, dilly-dallying is not an occasion for rejoicing. Rather,
it is-or ought to be-a stimulus for re-calculation. Since Doha, unfortunately, there has
been little of that.
D. THE "PoVERTY" AND "IsLAM" CHALLENGES
What were-and still are-those two unmet challenges? "Poverty" and "Islam." First,
the United States did not build a consensus among developing countries for trade liberal-
ization. That failure stemmed from its persistent under-estimation of the depth of suspicion
in poor countries about the effects on them of trade liberalization under the WTO agree-
ments reached during the Uruguay Round.
Second, the United States did not make a persuasive link between trade liberalization,
on the one hand, and the enhancement of peace and stability through closer ties with Islamic
countries, on the other hand. This failure reflected under-estimation of the potential con-
tribution to national security (not only of the United States, but the entire industrialized
world) from better integrating some of these countries into the global trading system.
Thus, the argument against the conventional wisdom is that the Doha Ministerial Con-
ference was an exercise in temporizing. That disappointing result was ineluctable. Why?
Because the WTO member to which all other members look for leadership had not ad-
dressed, and to some degree not even acknowledged the potency of, challenges involving
the developing and Islamic worlds.
Metaphorically, what occurred at Doha was "the can was kicked down the road." The
can is the body of substantive trade law issues. The delegations did the kicking. Among
those who kicked with the biggest foot and the greatest force was the United States (though
the European Union (EU) wore a large shoe too). The disposition of the can-lying there,
as it is now, several yards down the street-is highly uncertain. The can could be kicked
yet further down, it could be avoided entirely, or it could be picked up and disposed of, in
the sense of the issues it metaphorically symbolizes could be resolved once and for all.
E. WHY THE BuoyANcy?
If it is premature to dub Doha successful, then why is the buoyant characterization of
Doha the conventional wisdom? Perhaps the community of civilized nations needed a "feel-
good" interpretation after the dreadful day, September 11. Perhaps the courageous-and
they were brave--delegates voyaging to Doha with security threats needed to believe the
30. Pruzin, Trade Officials, supra note 11, at 1858.
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personal risks they took were not in vain. The answer also lies in the atmosphere on No-
vember 8, 2001. Were the expectations not low? If little or nothing was expected by way
of agreement on a substantive agenda, then by that meaninglessly low threshold, of course
Doha was a "success."
Conversely, inflated expectations must be disclaimed. WTO Ministerial Conferences
would be wondrous affairs if they dealt conclusively with every trade law issue of the bi-
ennium. Because that is too much to ask of trade ministers-some of whom, in contrast to
their deputies, are not programmed for detailed give-and-take sessions-in a week, agenda
formulation is a necessary part of these Conferences. An agreement for future talk is, by
definition, a possibility. But, the conventional wisdom sees lack of agreement on an agenda
(as occurred after the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999) as a melt down, and
avoidance thereof as success. That risks acceptance of under-achievement, and this risk
seems implicit in the post-Doha buoyancy of U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Robert
Zoellick: "We have removed the stain of Seattle."3 Well, yes, thank God. But, if escaping
a debacle is the best to expect, then the casualty will be more than just a balanced charac-
terization of what really was achieved. It will be a candid admission of the issues at stake,
and a push to meet them. Precisely that was the casualty of Doha.
F. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
The argument is that at Doha, the can was kicked down the road. Why was it kicked?
Essentially (but, of course, not entirely) because of twin failures: to address definitively
discordant views from poor countries, and to weave Muslim countries into a cogent vision
for national security. This argument proceeds in four sections.
Sections II and III lay out the trade law challenges not met by the United States, and the
miscalculations that lay behind the failure to meet them. Section II discusses the challenge
of forging a consensus for multilateral trade liberalization, unmet because of under-
estimating hostility among developing countries toward freer trade. Section II deals with
the challenge of associating trade liberalization with security enhancement, unmet because
of under-estimating how trade relations with some Islamic countries might strengthen this
link. Section IV concludes with points about empathy and humility.
II. The Poverty Challenge
Eradication of mass poverty was the laudable and overarching objective of our leaders and
thinkers, including Dadabhai Naoroji, Mahatma Gandhi, and Pandit Nehru... More than
five decades after independence we are, alas, nowhere near achieving this objective.32
A. Foua DDA FACTS
Perhaps developing countries, especially the least-developed countries, "did better [at
Doha] than even they had expected"" in obtaining assurances that TRIPS patent provisions
would not be used to block access via compulsory licensing to essential medical supplies,
31. Jonqui~res, WTO Reaches, supra note 6.
32. T.N. S1NrvAsA, EiGHT LECTURES ON INDIA's EcONOMIc REFORMS xi (2000).
33. Jonqui~res, All-Night, supra note 7. But see Seeds Sown for Future Growth, ECoNoMis-r, Nov. 17, 2001, at
65 (reporting that "[p]oor countries were much less excited" about the DDA).
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and in keeping an explicit trade-labor rights link off the DDA. Yes, the USTR's conciliatory
style toward poor countries won praise.34 True, they received "pledges of fresh technical
assistance"" for capacity building, to include at least $9 million for a "Doha Development
Agenda Trust Fund" for use in training programs.3 6 (Put aside the fact that the figure is
proposed, and the funding is through voluntary contributions by members.")
Still, is it excessive to identify contrasting views in the First and Third Worlds of trade
law and its effects as a great schism plaguing the WTO? Third World activists urge a re-
appraisal, dubbing the new round a "disaster for the world's poor," with Barry Coates,
Director of the World Development Movement, calling the DDA "empty of develop-
ment.""
Consider the following four facts about the DDA from a developing country vantage
point.
(1) Intellectual Property and Compulsoy Licensing Arguably, the Doha TRIPS Declaration
grants no new rights regarding compulsory licensing to developing countries. 9 The text of
the Declaration clearly re-affirms the existing TRIPS provisions.4° Paragraph 4 "reiterat[es]
our [i.e., the VTO members'] commitment to the TRIPS Agreement," and paragraph 5
"maintain[s] our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement." 41 These re-affirmations appear
designed to ensure compulsory licenses are granted in accordance with TRIPS article 31,
which deals with the matter.
(2) Intellectual Property and Imports: Notwithstanding the possible controversy over
whether the Doha TRIPS Declaration actually expands the right of WTO members to
grant compulsory licenses, the silence of the Declaration on imported pharmaceuticals is
telling. The Declaration benefits only those poor countries with the capability to manu-
facture the necessary medicines--otherwise, a compulsory license has no practical value.
The Declaration says nothing about whether a country without this ability can override a
patent in the interest of public health by importing cheap copies of a patented drug from
a third country. The VTO's TRIPS Council has until the end of 2002 to resolve the matter.
(3) S & D Treatment fir Export Subsidy Phase-Outs: Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement
gives developing countries until January 1, 2003 to phase out these prohibited (or "red
light") subsidies, while least-developed countries are exempt from the obligation to elimi-
nate them. An extension beyond this date is possible, if an application was submitted to the
WTO's SCM Committee at least one year earlier (i.e., by December 31, 2002).42 Eighteen
developing countries met the deadline. 43 The DDA states that when the Committee ap-
34. See Jonqui~res, All-Nigbt, supra note 7.
35. See id.
36. See Guy de Jonquitres, Europe: Move to Bring More Poor Countries to Trade Round, FIN. TMEs, Feb. 4,
2002, at 2.
37. See Daniel Pruzin, Moore Hails "Outstanding Year"fir WTO, Says Budget Hike Will Aid Poorer members,
19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 9 (Jan. 3, 2002).
38. James Harding & Michael Mann, Activists Call Deal "Dirasterfir Poor Peoples' Protestors," FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2001, at 6.
39. See Chris Rugaber, Intellectual Property: TRIPS Declaration Does Not Undermine IP Rigbts, Pharmaceutical
Groups Say, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1862-63 (Nov. 22, 2001).
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proves the extension for phasing out an export subsidy program, it will be renewed auto-
matically each year until the end of 2007, as long as the subsidizing country does not change
its program to prefer local firms, and follows transparency obligations.- However, only
export subsidies involving the full or partial exemption from tariffs and internal taxes that
existed before September 1, 2001 are eligible for automatic renewal. 41 Likewise, only a
developing country with a share of world merchandise export trade of less than 0.10 percent,
and a gross national product in 2000 of $20 billion or less, is eligible.4
(4) The Ban on Taxing E-Commerce:47 The ban applies to digitized goods, i.e., goods like
printed materials, software, music, films, and video games that could be shipped physically,
but are transmitted across the internet. However, assuming many such goods were shipped
in digitized form, the top ten potential losers of tax revenue from this ban, other than the
EU (the largest loser in dollar terms of foregone customs duties), Canada (6th), and Israel
(10th), would be developing countries: India (2nd); Mexico (3rd); Malaysia (4th), Brazil
(5th), China (7th), Morocco (8th), and Argentina (9th).48
These facts suggest that it is sensible to re-appraise the heralded success of Doha. Lest
there be any doubt, consider the post-Doha remark of Director-General Moore: "We're
setting ourselves up for a difficult fifth ministerial."49
B. TRADE LAw AS A TRANSLATION DEVIcE
The starting point for a re-appraisal is to appreciate that for most developed country
WTO members trade law translates into practice the economic theory in favor of elimi-
nating tariff and non-tariff barriers. Trade law is the device to implement comparative
advantage pioneered by classical economists, namely David Ricardo, and embellished by
neo-classical and modern economists. Yet, industrialized countries do not invariably use
trade law for this purpose; hence the result is not perfect implementation of economic
doctrine.Y° Were that so, trade law texts would be blissfully short, mandating an end to
barriers without delay, exception, or allowance for recidivism.
In fact, for the industrialized countries, indeed for all WTO members, trade law has a
key secondary function. It serves as a political regulatory device, as the Financial Times
instructed in Doha's wake:
Although countries benefit economically from dismantling their own trade barriers, rather than
those of trading partners, political logic works the other way round. To win domestic support
for trade liberalisation, politicians need to show they are doing their utmost to open others'
markets, while conceding as little as possible."
44. Draft Ministerial Declaration, supra note 11.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Daniel Pruzin, Information Technology: Developing Countries Seen Losing Most from WTO E-Commerce
Duty Moratorium, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1900 (Nov. 29, 2001).
48. Id.
49. Pruzin, Moore Warns, supra note 23.
50. See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and United States Trade Law: The Incomplete Implementation of Comparative
Advantage Theory, 2 J. LEGAL. EcoN. 95 (1992) (arguing that the translation of economic theory into practice is
far from perfect, particularly because of the (1) lack of private party participation in the application of trade
rules, and (2) interference to the operation of comparative advantage caused by trade remedies).
51. Jonquihres, All-Night, supra note 7.
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That is, trade law is a means to reach a new equilibrium among domestic economic agents
(producers, consumers, and the government) when a shift to freer trade is contemplated.
Trade law manages the shift, typically eschewing a dramatic, instantaneous expurgation of
tariffs and quantitative restrictions in favor of carefully crafted phase-out periods coupled
with safeguard remedies should disequilibrium (i.e., unacceptably high short-term adjust-
ment costs that might threaten the political or social order) arise.
The First World's understanding of trade law as a translation device is premised on the
belief that the freer trade regime it puts into practice is normatively good. The criterion
for "goodness" is a utilitarian calculation that, on balance, trade liberalization is a gain for
a country and, by extension, the world. Ricardo gave a static net gain rationale in the 19th
century, and it has been elaborated and refined in recent models of dynamic gains.
Translation is precisely what many non-industrialized countries dispute with wealthier
WTO members. In the view of these countries, the net gains are, first, theoretical. In
practice, they do not always work out quite the way economists predict, because of the
messy details of reality. That aside, the second and more important objection is that net
gains tend to accrue in the First World.
Yes, some sectors in some developing countries benefit from more export opportunities,
and consumers in those countries with sufficient incomes enjoy a broader and cheaper range
of consumption opportunities. Still, on balance, the perception is that the legal regime of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO do not deliver the net
benefits-in the form of faster growth and income-poverty reduction-that the First World
and its economic theorists claim. Fifty years (i.e., since the GATT, dated October 30, 1947,
entered into force on January 1, 19482) of trade liberalization may have done a lot of good,
but only for a handful of countries-at least that is the impression. This theory is reinforced
by assorted statistics and projections, such as those of the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD forecasts that by 2015, only one of the World's
forty-nine poorest countries, Lesotho, will cross the threshold of $900 per capita GNP, and
thenceforth graduate from the unhappy cohort of "least developed" countries (those with
less than $1,000 per capita GNP) to "developing" countries. Of the remaining forty-eight
countries, twenty-one will not cross it in 100 years.53
Never mind there is empirical evidence to rebut this perception. Most recently, the World
Bank's Policy Research Report, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty (2002) points to a
strong association between (1) trade liberalization, and (2) economic growth and poverty
reduction.14 Forget, also, the well-developed body of S&D treatment rules to help devel-
52. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HANDBOOK 50 (2001) (entry on "GATT") [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
53. See Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, International Eonomy & the Americas: Poor Countries Talks to Aim
at "Deliverables," FIN. TMES, May 14, 2001, at 5; Mike Moore, How to Lift the Barriers to Growth, FIN. TMEs,
May 14, 2001, at 11.
54. See also David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, 81 FOREIGN App. 120 (2002) (concluding that
over the last twenty years, the integration of developing countries with developed countries has afforded poor
people the opportunity to improve their lives); David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth It Good for the Poor, DEv.
RESEARCH DEP'T, THE WORLD BANK STsy (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/
absddolakray.hom) (arguing from data from eighty countries over forty years that openness to trade increases
economic growth and the incomes of poor people in those countries rises proportionately with growth); Dan
Ben-David et al., Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty (World Trade Organization Special Studies No. 5) (1999)
(arguing that developing countries that are more open to trade are catching up with developed countries as
regards living standards, and that trade liberalization contributes strongly to poverty alleviation).
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oping countries manage political and social problems associated with adjustment to freer
trade (i.e., rules just for them that play the secondary role of regulating the shift from an
equilibrium associated with a closed macro-economy to a new equilibrium of an open
macro-economy).55 Focus instead on the incongruous outlook held by Third World coun-
tries, which account for roughly 80 percent of the WTO's membership.' 6 By listening to
trade law officials, practitioners, professors, and (tellingly) students in the Third World, it
is easy to detect widespread skepticism about trade law and its effects.
C. TEN PERCEPTIONS
Even after Doha, the United States has yet to deal with anecdotal evidence easily gathered
by traveling to, for example, South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), East Asia
(e.g., China, Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand), and Latin America (e.g., Mexico and
Argentina). The perceptions may be grouped into ten general categories:
(1) Dominance of the Global Trading System: The global trading system is dominated by a
few hegemonic trading powers, led by the United States. This minority tends to be far
more interested in gaining market access to, or shutting imports out from, developing
countries than in promoting export-oriented growth in those countries. The powers preach
free trade until they come to the negotiating table with developing countries, when they
become mercantilists.
(2) Dominance of the WTO: The faces at the WTO Secretariat evince dominance by a
handful of industrialized countries. Of the 552 positions there in 2001, French citizens
occupied 129 of them. 7 The country with the second-highest representation was the United
Kingdom (71 British nationals held WTO Secretariat positions), followed by Spain (36),
Switzerland (31.5), Canada (26), the United States (23.5), Italy (16), Germany (13), and
Ireland (13).1s In other words, the top nine represented countries were western and indus-
trialized, accounting for 359 of the 552 jobs, or 65 percent of the posts. India was the only
Third World country with notable representation (with ten Indians holding positions). 9
Hardly any nationals hailed from significant developing countries like Malaysia (1.5 per-
sons) and Thailand (2).60 The Secretariat also fared poorly in staffing positions with citizens
of newly industrialized countries. None came from Singapore, and a de minimis number
from Korea (2), Brazil (2.5) and Mexico (2).61
55. See RAJ BI-IALA, TRADE, GROWTH, AND INJUSTICE pt. 4 (Foundation Press, forthcoming 2003) (classifying
and analyzing the S & D treatment rules in a "Theological Framework"); PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE
WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 133-88 (2000) (surveying the S & D treatment rules in the Multilateral
Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Understanding, reached during the Uruguay Round); Alice Alex-
andra Kipel, Special and Differential Treatmentfor Developing Countries, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIzATION
617, 626-60 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) (explaining the S & D rules in the Uruguay Round agreements).
56. See Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative, The WTO and New Global Trade Negotiations:
What's at Stake, Address Delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 2001),
at 8 (text prepared for delivery and distributed publicly).
57. The employment statistics are in World Trade Organization, Overview of the W7XO Secretariat, Table of
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(3) Dominance of the Languages of the W7O: Any visitor to the WVTO website has observed
that three languages pre-dominate the WTO: first and foremost, English, with French and
Spanish the other two functional languages.," The same observation is apparent from job
ads posted by the WTO in prominent publications like The Economist. Typically, English is
required, with proficiency in French or Spanish also required or highly desired and giving
English the highest status makes sense. It is the international language of business and the
Internet, and it is the second most-widely used language in the world, with 514 million
speakers. 63 But, it is a distant second to Mandarin Chinese, which boasts 885 million speak-
ers.-4 A close third to English is Hindi, with 496 million speakers.63 Spanish follows fourth,
with 425 million, and then comes Russian (275 million), Arabic (256 million speakers) and
Bengali (215 million speakers).66 French is ninth in the top ten, with 129 million speakers
(Japanese is tenth with 126 million speakers), approximately half of the number who con-
verse in Russian and Arabic, and 60 percent of the number of Bengali speakers. 67 From a
developing country perspective, even discounting the prominence of Spanish and French
in many developing countries, it is entirely reasonable to wonder why both Spanish and
French are featured so prominently, while no importance seems to be placed on the key
non-western Third World languages, namely, Mandarin, Hindi, Arabic, and Bengali. That
tilt in favor of the European languages-particularly French-may well reinforce the
skewed employment hiring patterns at the Secretariat noted above. The tilt is all the more
odd given that even in the affairs of the European Commission, the dominant language is
English (used, for example, for two-thirds of all internal documents).68 To put the point
more controversially, the languages used for WTO affairs ought not to be selected with a
view to appeasing proponents of a French cultural exception (or those, comme ce professeur,
who admire French language and culture), nor to entrenching the interests of any one
country or small group of countries in the Secretariat. Developing countries might reason-
ably ask whether an approach like that taken by the United Nations--designating a broader
number of working languages-might enhance the legitimacy of the WTO and the ability
of countries to participate. Or, they might take a more business-like approach, and lobby
for a universal English rule.
(4) Unequal Bargaining: It is true many developing countries "came of age" at Doha, by
adroitly building coalitions, organizing tactics, and setting goals.69 Examples were Nigeria
(which, on behalf of many African countries, argued successfully for deferral of negotiations
on government procurement and customs procedures because poor countries lacked re-
sources to negotiate immediately 0 ), Tanzania, and Uganda., Still, for two reasons, the
62. See generally WTO Web site, www.wto.org.
63. The statistics set forth herein are from Darlene Superville, Global Forces Silence Ethnic Tongues, WASH.





68. See Daniel Dombey, How English Became the Main Euro-Speak, FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2001, at 2.
69. Jonqui~res, All-Night, supra note 7.
70. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Plans Early Push for Reform of Customs, Public Procurement Rules in New WTO
Talks, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1935 (Dec. 6, 2001).
71. See id. In contrast, India's hectoring and obstructionism were highly controversial. See Letter to the editor:
Pascal Lamy is the Real Villain of the WTO's Doha Meeting, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 2001, at 8.
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bargaining table where multilateral trade negotiations occur remains slanted. The powerful
WTO members have large armies of highly trained trade lawyers, economists, and ac-
countants arrayed against a smaller number of less-expert representatives from developing
countries, some of who hold multiple portfolios (i.e., are responsible for several non-trade
fields, and thus are stretched in terms of time and energy). Moreover, there is a mismatch
of economies represented by officials at the table. The dominant economies are diversified,
hence they are unlikely to experience serious adverse effects should access to one export
market be curtailed, or one export sector fair poorly. In contrast, many developing country
WTO members have non-diversified economies, reliant on one or a small number of com-
modity exports, and their largest customers are the powerful members. Consequently, alien-
ating the officials from those members by taking a hard-line at the table is not a strategic
option.
(5) Legal Capacity and Effective Implementation: In 2001, the United States gave over $555
million in trade capacity assistance-more than any other country.72 But that help must be
juxtaposed with the problem. While, the Uruguay Round produced the broadest and most
complex trade agreements in history. Establishing the legal capacity to untie them, and sew
them into the fabric of domestic law, is the problem. The Decision taken at Doha on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns bespeaks the problem." Developing coun-
tries, lacking legal capacity, have a far worse time coming to grips with the texts than
developed countries, where the shortage of skilled trade lawyers is not acute. Some-like
Bangladesh-have not yet enacted all of the accords into domestic law.
(6) Near-Impossibility of Effective Participation: Even if Third World WTO members com-
prehended and fully implemented the legal agreements from the previous trade round, they
could hardly be expected to keep up with the pace of activity at the WTO. Indeed, they
have virtually no say over that pace. The key WTO members, in terms of setting agendas
and priorities, organizing meetings, formulating positions, and so forth, are the usual sus-
pects. Many developing country members cannot participate fully in WTO affairs as struc-
tured by members like the United States. For example, there are dozens of meetings at the
WTO per week. However, many Third World members cannot afford a permanent mission
in Geneva, or if they can, to staff it with multiple delegates. Thus, coverage of these meet-
ings-much less playing a leading role in them-is impossible.
(7) Skewed Benefits from Import Liberalization: The Uruguay Round obligations aim to
liberalize imports of goods and services, which means the rules benefit the hegemonic
trading powers already possessing diversified economies. Their businesses gain from in-
creased market access when developing countries, in compliance with the obligations, open
to imports of goods and services. Indeed, these multi-national corporations sometimes are
well capitalized and expert enough to re-colonize developing country economies, should
they be permitted to do so. As for import-competing sectors in developed countries, the
risks from further trade liberalization are low. In most sectors, tariff barriers already have
been reduced to historically low levels, so they already have made the transition to freer
trade. In sectors still protected by tariff spikes or quantitative restrictions, the developed
country WTO members are wealthy enough to afford adjustment assistance for dislocated
72. See Zoellick, supra note 56, at 10.
73. See Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session (Doha), Implementation-Relatedlsues and Concerns, Decision,
WT/MIN(01)/W/10 (Nov. 14, 2001).
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workers and industries (even if they do not always provide it on generous or efficient terms),
whenever liberalization occurs.
(8) Victimization by Trade Remedies: In some import-competing sectors considered sen-
sitive, developed countries eagerly and vigorously use trade remedies-principally, AD,
CVD, or safeguards-to extend the nature and duration of protection. There is a deliberate
irony here. Those sectors tend to be precisely the ones in which developing countries are
most likely to gain a comparative advantage (e.g., steel, textiles, low-value added manufac-
turing items, and agriculture, especially cotton, rice, and sugar), if open to free trade. In-
deed, roughly 70 percent of exports from the poorest countries are in farm products and
labor-intensive manufactured goods like textiles.1 Applying trade remedies impedes infant
industries growth in Third World countries, and thereby of competitive, diversified econ-
omies.
(9) Negative Effects on Least Developed Countries: Quite evident are negative effects on the
world's forty-nine least developed countries of defacto mercantilism by a handful of powerful
countries, their dominance of the WTO and trade negotiations, and the application of
trade law obligations and remedies." Of these forty-nine countries (the largest of which is
Bangladesh), thirty-four are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The least developed countries are home
to about 10 percent of the world's population-over 600 million people, who survive on
an annual per capita GNP of less than $250.76 Yet, in 1990, the least developed countries
accounted for 0.48 percent of world exports." In 1999, the figure fell to 0.40 percent. Even
if it were to rise significantly, the increase would make little difference absent concomitant
debt relief. Two-thirds of the world's poorest forty-nine countries have unsustainable debt
burdens."0 Hence, investing new export earnings in local economies would be compromised
by their use for debt service.
(10) Legal Capacity and WTO Litigation: Whenever a Third World country member fails
to meet its import liberalization obligations or is suspected of an unfair trade practice, it
faces a dumping or subsidization suit from a developed country. Likewise, if a poor member,
employing fair practices, manages to penetrate significantly a product market in a powerful
WTO member, then it is likely to face a safeguard action. Whatever the gravamen of the
complaint, the consequent litigation will follow the DSU. In reality, most DSU cases are
wars the powerful WTO members are best able to fight. Yes, small countries have defeated
large ones in some cases. But in general, it is only powerful members that possess armies
of trade lawyers, backed by multinational corporate interests. In some Third World coun-
tries government agencies responsible for trade matters, like the Bangladesh Ministry of
Commerce, have no full-time staff of attorneys versed in international trade law equipped
to handle WTO complaints, much less to bring them. Nor is there a budget to obtain the
legal weaponry necessary to fight in Geneva.
Introducing this anecdotal evidence is not a comment on the accuracy of the ten per-
ceptions. It is offered for its probative value. It demonstrates views of WTO members,
which contain roughly four billion of the world's 6.5 billion people. That demographic fact
74. See Seeds, supra note 33.
75. See generally Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, Talks on Poor Lands WillAim at "Defiverables, "FIN. TIMES,
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suggests, whether true or not, perception matters when held by so large a block. Indeed,
there is more than just anecdotal evidence.
There is testimonial evidence of the lack of a consensus among Third World countries
for further trade liberalization. The testimonies are from trade ministers who represented
these countries at Doha. In their prepared statements (posted on the WTO's Web site
during the Conference), they highlighted the disconnect between the promises of the Uru-
guay Round agreements and their actual effects.' 9
D. EXTENDING THE MELIAN DIALOGU?
Apparently, the United States did not deal with these perceptions in any systematic or
effective way. Rather, it touted the benefits of freer trade. It repeated its faith in the Uruguay
Round as a large part of the cure for Third World problems,s° essentially saying: "Yes, well,
whatever, don't worry; just look at these statistics-keep liberalizing and things will im-
prove."
The benefits are not chimerical, and the earnestness of American's belief is not in doubt.
U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, may well be correct in declaring "It]he poor are not
poor because of too much globalization, but because of too little."8' Yet, perceptions some-
times get confused with reality. It happened before and at Doha, and the mess has yet to
be sorted out. No unscrambling will occur so long as the American response remains no
more imaginative than sloughing off earnest perceptions.
What will continue is a string of American "successes," in the sense of trade negotiation
agendas that, like the DDA, accords with American producer interests. Yes, at Doha, the
United States "gave" some on intellectual property and dumping. But it made no dramatic
pro-development commitments. To the contrary, it continued to push to the agenda issues
deeply troubling to Third World WTO members. Enforcing labor standards, and increas-
ing participation in WTO adjudication by non-governmental organizations (NGO) are
examples.
Certainly, these innovations promise long-term gains, to developing country workers and
to the legitimacy of the DSU mechanism. But from a poor country's perspective, both
initiatives could drive up its costs of production (resulting from higher labor standards),
and litigation costs (owing to more complex procedures involving multiple parties). Thus,
the poor country might well view the Doha result not so much as a success, but as an
79. See, e.g., Statement by the Honourable Manuel Roxas II, Secretary of Trade and Industry, WT/MIN(01)/
ST/8 (Nov. 10,2001) (stating that "Proponents [of a new round of trade negotiations] again remind us of the
benefits that will accrue [to] developing countries if we agree to the issues which make up this new round.
Proponents cite the benefits from increased trade; for them, this certainly has been their experience. Ours is
different.").
80. See, e.g., Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, WT/M1N(01)/
ST/3, (Nov. 10, 2001), at 2 (acknowledging implementation problems with the Uruguay Round agreements,
and then stating that "[tihe trade liberalization ushered in by the Uruguay Round highlights the potential of
more trade for developing nations"); Zoellick, supra note 56, at 8-9 (stating that "[tirade is a critical element
- perhaps the most important element - in economic development, offering the biggest, and most lasting,
dividends," discussing a World Bank study indicating that developing countries that open themselves to trade
grow faster, and experience faster declines in poverty, than those that do not, pointing to the benefits of
openness experienced by South Korea and the costs of protection incurred by Ghana, citing statistics on export
growth from developing countries after the Uruguay Round, and linking open trade with political reform).
81. See Zoellick, supra note 56, at 9.
SPRING 2002
174 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
extension of the Ancient Greek Melian Dialogue to international trade relations: that the
strong will do what they do, and the weak will suffer what they must.
Ill. The Islam Challenge
Against Western claims that Islamic "fundamentalism" feeds terrorism, one powerful paradox
of the twentieth century is often overlooked. While Islam may generate more political violence
than Western culture, Western culture generates more street violence than Islam. Islam does
indeed produce a disproportionate share of mujahideen, but Western culture produces a dis-
proportionate share of muggers. The largest Muslim city in Africa is Cairo. The largest west-
ernized city is Johannesburg. Cairo is much more populous than Johannesburg, but street
violence is only a fraction of what it is in the South African city. Does Islam help pacify Cairo?
I, along with many others, believe that it does. The high premium Islam places on umma
(community) and ijma (consensus) has made for a Pax Islamica in day-to-day life. 2
A. WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD TRADE
Since at least the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Americans have gorged on a visual
diet of scenes of angry Muslims, dressed in traditional garb, burning the Stars and Stripes,
compelling women to wear a hijab (veil), and marching unquestioningly to a mullah's call
of Allah-hu-Akbar ("God is Great"). Imbalanced diets lead to bad health, and these victuals
have caused both seizure and paralysis. The convulsions are about military defense-how
to guard against the ostensible Islamic threat to America's interests. The lack of movement
concerns trade law-how to integrate more fully Islamic countries into the GATT-WTO
system and, how that integration might contribute to America's security.
A grand vision of international trade is that insofar as it leads to economic growth and
poverty reduction, it gives trading nations a stake in the international economic order. As
the standard Ricardian paradigm predicts, stakeholders benefit from a broader array of
cheaper consumption opportunities owing to increased imports, and from broader market
access for exported items they make. In turn, the incentive to engage in international war
or conflict diminishes. No economically rational stakeholder would destroy the salubrious
economic linkages.
Peace through trade is not a turn-of-the-millennium insight. In the 1930s, this vision
prompted reversal of protectionist legislation, and in the 1940s, the birth of multilateral
economic agreements like GA'IT. It was manifest in the work of President Franklin Roo-
sevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. 3 Secretary Hull helped dismantle many of the
notorious Smoot-Hawley tariffs by negotiating thirty-two bilateral trade pacts with twenty-
seven countries, under the authority of legislation he supported, the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934.14 In these bilateral deals, he inserted an unconditional most-
favored nation (MFN) clause, thereby ensuring the spread of barrier reductions to third
82. Ali A. Mazrui, Llamic and Western Values, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 118, 130 (Sept./Oct. 1997).
83. See Michael A. Butler, CAUTIoUS VISIONARY - CORDELL HULL AND TRADE REFORM, 1933-1937 164-65,
168-69 (1998) (explaining Hull's vision of a liberal international economic order, and quoting Hull's suggested
language, which the President did not accept, for the 1936 Democratic Party platform condemning any return
to protectionism and arguing that "the permanent security of the United States will be better assured by the
maintenance of the principles of international justice and fair dealing than by the sole force of arms").
84. See Zoellick, supra note 56, at 2.
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countries.s5 This vision-while not forgotten-has not been applied to the context in which
it now is most needed: trade with Islamic countries.
8 6
If opportunities created by trade liberalization nourish would-be Islamic entrepreneurs
who otherwise might feed off, or be ruined by, violence and terrorism, then surely it is in
America's-and the world's-security to offer the healthy sustenance. What better way to
do so than invite these countries to participate more fully in global trade? Given that Islam
now boasts 1.2 billion adherents (second only to Christianity's 2 billion followers),7 and
appears to be the world's fastest growing religion, is there really any choice but to make
the invitation as attractive as possible?
B. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL INVITEES
Invitations, done properly, should be sent with care. Paying heed to which Islamic coun-
tries ought to be invited is no less important than coming around to the understanding that
some ought to be invited. Precisely how is the United States to decide among the potential
invitees to the trade liberalization gala? The gala really is a process, not a one-off event. It
is meaningful and mutually rewarding participation in the GATT-WTO system and sen-
sible regional and bilateral free trade arrangements.
Is one cause of paralysis in its trade law an implicit acceptance of the dichotomy between
"fundamentalists" and "moderates"? That beguiling dichotomy is a veil over the variegated
responses from the Islamic World in its struggle to come to terms with Western culture.
Some parts of that World see the culture as decadent, and embodied in wave after wave of
exports of goods and services. Trade links are regarded as the conduit for the marauding
exports."s By extension, the pre-eminent institution dedicated to widening the conduit, the
WTO, and its prominent champion, the United States, are viewed with suspicion. The
adjective "some" must be stressed. This perspective hardly is universal among Muslims.
Moreover, an irony must not be lost-who is threatening whom? Many Americans believe
their country's interests are under siege from a "militant Islam," 9 all the more so after
85. See id.
86. Thus, for example, Representative James P. Moran (D.-Virginia) articulated the link, yet without ex-
tending it expressly to underdeveloped Islamic countries: "The real threat to our country are the millions of
people who live in poverty and desperation around the world. The most potent weapon we have to fight that
is free and open trade." Joseph Kahn, A Nation Challenged: The Legislation - Gain for Trade Bill That Some See
as Aid in Terrorism Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at B1.
87. See Tad Szulc, Abraham - Father of Three Faiths, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 2001), at 90, 96 (retracing
the trek of Abraham, the patriarch of three major religions, through the Middle East, and providing demo-
graphic statistics).
88. The matter of culture and trade tends to be viewed as a conflict between, on the one hand, France and
Francophone countries, and, on the other hand, the rest of the world. The matter takes legal shape in terms
of an exemption from GATT and WTO obligations for cultural industries. This approach is like viewing a
splendid room in Versailles through a keyhole - many parts of the room remain hidden from view. Similarly,
many linguistic, ethnic, and religious groups beyond the Francophone world are concerned about the effect of
trade liberalization on their traditions and ways of life. Constituencies in the Islamic world are among such
groups.
89. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING IsLAM How THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERaMINE How WE
SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD (Rev. ed., 1997) (discussing the biases in media coverage that result in Islam
being seen as synonymous with religious extremism and terrorism). To be sure, not all of the accounts have
taken this approach. See, e.g., ISLAM AND THE WEST (Richard N. Frye ed., 1957) (containing a collection of
essays on the possibility of an Islamic renaissance).
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September 11. This belief puzzles some Muslims, who have felt themselves threatened by
an exploitative, well financed, and militarily superior, the West, ever since the Crusades.90
In brief, appreciating subtleties and nuances among potential invitees in the Islamic
World to the gala is necessary to treat the paralysis in American trade law, and to move
toward a durable nexus between trade and security. That is, the challenge is to sort out the
panoply and identify counterparts sharing the vision Secretary Hull embodied. To help
meet this challenge, there is no dearth of journalistic and think-tank literature on trends in
Islamic countries. Among the highly-regarded academic discussions are the works of Pro-
fessor John Esposito-namely, Voices of Resurgent Islam,91 Islam-The Straight Path,92 Islam
and Politics,9 and Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?94 As far back as 1983, he studied twin (and
probably symbiotic) forces in much of the Islamic World: (1) disillusionment with wholly
the a-religious, western models of development; and (2) revival that bears multiple facets.
These forces are symbiotically linked, and it is the dynamism inherent in the second that
might lead Muslims to a brighter future reminiscent of the grand past they enjoyed until
the end of the Islamic Caliphates (specifically the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs at Medina
(632-661 A.D.), the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 A.D.), centered in Damascus, and the
Abbassid Caliphate (750-1258 A.D.), centered in Baghdad 5 ), which was marked by the
sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258. Professor Esposito's observation about these
forces is no less true now than two decades ago when he wrote it, and only a few modest
changes would be needed-words like "globalization" and acronyms like "WTO"-to bring
the passage perfectly up to date:
If Islam's past strength, success, and power were signs of God's guidance and pleasure with
the Islamic community's realization of His Will, modern Muslim history has instead been a
record of the ummah's [i.e., the Islamic community's] failure. Colonial rule, continued depen-
dence on the West, and the disastrous Arab-Israeli war of 1967 were clear signs of an errant,
debilitated community. Since Islamic belief and history taught that success and power were
signs of a faithful community, Muslims might well ask "What had gone wrong in the Islamic
world?" and "Why had God seemingly abandoned his community?" Religious leaders and
traditionists in general countered that God had not abandoned the Muslims; rather the Mus-
lims in pursuing a Western secular path of development had departed from and must now
"return" to the straight path of Islam.
Modern elites were particularly disillusioned. They had cast their lot as members of devel-
oping nations with a Western-oriented future. Yet, they continued to find themselves victims
of Western neo-colonialism....
If the West had failed Muslims as an ally, what of the Western models of development so
eagerly adopted by Muslim governments? The record of elite policies in nation building was
judged to be dismal indeed... Problems of authoritarianism, legitimacy, and political partic-
ipation continued to plague most Muslim countries... In addition, corruption and the con-
90. See, e.g., AMIN MAALOUF, THE CRUSADES THROUGH ARAB EYES (1984) (relying on the works of Arab
chroniclers for an account of Saladin and the defeat of the Crusaders).
91. VoIcEs OF RESURGENT ISLAM 0ohn L. Esposito ed., 1983).
92. JOHN L. EsPoSITO, ISLAM - THE STRAIGHT PATH (1991).
93. JOHN L. EsPosITo, ISLAM AND POLITICS (3d ed. 1991).
94. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAMIC THREAT: MYr OR REALI'Y? (1992). See generally Audio Tape: Professor
John Swanson in the lecture series, Islam (1997) (Part II of the "Great World Religions" (available from The
Teaching Company)), and the accompanying outline. I draw from that lecture as well as Professor Esposito's
works.
95. See JOHN L. EsPosITo, THE ISLAMIC THREAT - MYTH OR REALITY 31 (2d ed. 1995).
VOL. 36, NO. I
POVERTY, ISLAM, AND DOHA 177
centration of wealth persisted as twin pillars of Muslim society while poverty, illiteracy, and
overpopulation galloped along unchecked ... The positive benefits of modernization seemed
to benefit the few, while the lot of the masses remained relatively unchanged.
Muslim revivalists insist that the current religious revival is not simply a reaction to the
West, but rather is part of an ongoing process of revival (tajdid) and reform (islab) which reflects
a continuing tradition in Islamic history... However, the meaning and method of renewal
varies with changing historical circumstances. What emerges is the picture of a tradition which,
although fixed and stable, is neither stagnant nor monolithic. When the existing conditions
and institutions of Islam seemed to warrant it, Muslim reformers have felt free to challenge
the blind following of tradition (taqlid) and the Islamic establishment. They claimed their right
to engage in independent analysis or interpretation (jtibad) in order to re-form their societies.96
Not surprisingly, Professor Esposito inspires a move beyond the dichotomy, and uncovers
three categories of response by the Islamic World over the last 100-150 years to the per-
ceived western threat.
The first response, also the most conservative, is "Traditional Reformism." It calls for
full implementation of, and strict adherence, to the Sbaria ("the Sacred Law of Islam"97).
The Sbari'a is conceived as a body of principles and obligations grounded firmly in the
Koran and Sunna (the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)). 98 According
to the Classical Theory of the Sbari'a,99 these two are the most important-or "fundamen-
tal"-fonts of law. Lesser emphasis is placed on the two remaining sources, Qiyaas (analog-
ical reasoning'0° ) and Ijmaa (consensus), which developed over the last 1,400 years (since
the Prophet's death in 632 A.D.) through the work of the ulama (religious scholars'0').
The logic behind the Traditional Reformist call is that the Sbari'a is a complete system
that does not need amendment or supplement by modernist legislation or policy-oriented
reasoning. Its inherent sobriety makes it the most exacting and, not surprisingly, the least
popular (in terms of the number of Islamic societies that have heeded this call) response to
the West. Saudi Arabia, under the influence of the Wabhabi movement, and Afghanistan,
under the former Taliban regime, are among the few examples of Traditional Reformism
in practice.
In the Esposito-inspired scheme, the second response to Western values embedded in
goods and services exports is "Neo-Traditional Reformism." Not unlike Traditional Re-
formists, Neo-Traditional Reformists seek to return to Islamic traditions based on the Koran
and Sunna, which are accepted as the fundamental sources of the Sbari'a. °2 Neither re-
96. John L. Esposito, Islam and Muslim Politics, in VOICES OF RESURGENT IsLAM, supra note 91, at 11-12,
14.
97. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO IsL^MIc LAW 302 (1982).
98. "PBUH" is an Islamic term of respect typically following a reference to the name of the Prophet
Muhammad. It stands for "Peace Be Unto Him." To my mind, it is unfortunate when this acronym is ignored
by western writers. Having stated it initially, for reasons of economy, hereinafter I shall assume it implicitly.
No disrespect is intended by this economy. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, IsLAM - A SHORT HisToRY 202 (2000)
(defining "sunnab").
99. See ScHAcHT, supra note 97, ch. 9 (explaining the Classical Theory).
100. Id. at 300..
101. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 98, at 202.
102. Not surprisingly, IbnTaymaiya is popular among Neo-Traditionalists. Living in Syria during the late
13th and early 14th Centuries A.D., he was one of the prominent "Rejectionists," a critic of the great synthesis
of AI-Ghazali - and one who emphasized the Koran and Sunna. Neo-Traditionalists look to his methodology
for inspiration in coming to terms with modernity.
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sponse wants to alter basic traditions in light of Western influence. However, the word
"Neo" is the clue to the difference between the two responses.
Traditional Reformists see nothing they like in Western values or structures. Their "re-
form" is rather like turning back the clock to the time of the recitation of the Koran and
establishment of the Sunna. Neo-Traditional Reformists also seek guidance in the Koran
and Sunna, but with a view to the present and future. Indubitably, the consequent reactions
must be consistent with patterns in traditional Islamic society-yet, they are novel rejoin-
ders. In sum, the response earns its prefix, because it returns to fundamental sources to find
new ways to revive Islamic society, and the innovations can be justified precisely because
they are grounded in tradition10°
That is not to say Neo-Traditional Reformists want an accommodation with western
values and structures. On the one hand, not everything about the West coming via cross-
border trade is worthy of embargo. Science and technology can be value free, and used to
benefit Islamic societies. On the other hand, contradictions with the essential values of the
Koran and Sunna are to be avoided. Neo-Traditionalists examine the (sometimes literal)
meaning of the Koran, with a view to re-directing their societies in response to modernity.
Likewise, re-discovery of the Sunna may result in societal re-orientation respectful of pat-
terns established during the Prophet's days. Accordingly, there is a certain "case-by-case"
methodology in this response, with an underlying wariness of the West.
The third response in Esposito's typology is "Liberal Reformism." It is unequivocally
distinct from both Traditional and Neo-Traditional Reformism. It accepts as a legitimate
objective accommodation with what the West has to offer. Liberal Reformists urge Islamic
societies to change in the Global Age, albeit in a manner that accords with the guidance of
the Koran and Sunna. Rather than seeing these fonts of the Sbari'a as irreconcilable with
the West (the Traditional Reformist tendency) or in an uneasy tension with the West (the
Neo-Traditional Reformist tendency), Liberal Reformists see them illuminating a construc-
tive and positive relationship with the West.
Their light reveals no contradiction between their essential precepts, on the one hand,
and western science, technology, and some western values, on the other hand. In other
words, for Liberal Reformists, it is possible to go back to the Koran and Sunna, and use
them to construct a modem Islamic society. That society is well adjusted to globalization,
and seeks to draw out what is best from the West. But it also is inspired by 1,400 years of
defining and elaborating the Shari'a.
The obvious flexibility of Liberal Reformism derives from a concept of the divine origin
of the "best." What is "best" in any society--Christian or Muslim-is so because God put
it there in the first place. That origin imparts "best-ness." So, even if a good or service is
exported from the West, if it is "best," then accommodating it surely is consistent with
guidance from the Koran and Sunna. Certainly, accommodation does not mean capitulation.
If the ultimate origin of the import is not divine, hence it is not the "best," then rejection
would be appropriate, pursuant to guidance from the Koran and Sunna.
103. What are examples of "new" responses - reforms to Islamic society from within - put forth by the
Neo-Traditionalists? Most notably, there is the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 and the subsequent devel-
opment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood movement that began in Egypt in the
1920s, and remains active.
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C. INVTE Two OF THE THREE
By eschewing a division of the Islamic World into "findamentalists" and "everyone else,"
and appreciating perceptive delineations of the type suggested by Esposito, it is easier to
consider two tasks for American trade law toward the Islamic World: (1) identifying worthy
invitees, and (2) issuing sincere invitations to the trade liberalization gala. Neither task is
easy.
Each demands empathy from American trade officials, i.e., realization they are not alone
in sensing threat, and thus appreciation for how the varied Islamic responses to the West
and its values bespeak differences in enthusiasm for engagement in Hull's vision for world
trade. Which response predominates in which country? In a single country two, or even all
three, responses, may co-exist (uneasily), depending on which geographic area, or which
ethnic, linguistic, or ideological group is examined. Unscrambling the complexities and
assessing which response is (or can be bolstered to become) dominant is the heart of the
Islam challenge.
This challenge is tough in the post-September 11th era. Since then, the United States
has re-invigorated the dichotomy, putting Islamic countries into one of two camps: evil
terrorists and their rogue-nation supporters (i.e., the fundamentalists), and good allies seek-
ing to bring terrorists to justice (i.e., everyone else). That rhetoric is appealing in the war
on terrorism. It is not a basis on which to build a network of trade ties in the war for
prosperity. Indeed, it is a basis America rejected in its recent history. Had the good-versus-
evil mind-set carried over from Second World War battles to post-War trading strategy,
perhaps America would not have invited former enemies into the Marshall Plan or multi-
lateral trading system. Arguably, the United States is rejecting the good-versus-evil ap-
proach in its economic policy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Balkans.
Thus, the second task-having identified proper invitees and issuing the invitations-
really is more of an extension than a revolution. Evidently, adherents to one movement,
Liberal Reformism, are favorably disposed to fuller participation in the multilateral trading
system and appropriate regional and bilateral trading arrangements. Neo-Traditional Re-
formists may not be implacably averse. Sincere invitations ought to be issued to countries
dominated (or possibly so) by them. Inviting Liberal Reformists, and possibly also Neo-
Traditional Reformists, may encourage these responses. The invitations are an opportunity
to show global trade is neither a vehicle for a Pax Americana nor inconsistent with the
essential principles of the Koran and Sunna. The invitations could also contribute to Amer-
ica's national security interest, and to international order.
How so? First, if there is anything to the Hull-type vision of peace through trade, then
impoverished Islamic countries that grow economically, in part through expanded trade,
will gain a stake hold in the global trade regime. (Their impoverished state is a point of
intersection between the Poverty and Islam challenges.) To a rational calculator, destroying
that regime may be a lot less appealing once its bounties flow to all segments of a society.
Second, an invitation may impress Liberal Reformists, and possibly also Neo-Traditional
Reformists, that another great schism in the world economy (one in addition to that between
the First and Third Worlds) is unacceptable. That emerging divide is between the capitalist
countries, mostly of Christendom or in which Christianity is growing, and developing
countries of the Muslim World. The invitation may underscore that the destiny of WTO
members is a common one: economic prosperity and physical security; or, economic stag-
nation (if not worse) and physical insecurity (again, if not worse).
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Third, the invitation may highlight the importance the United States places on the first
word in the WTO-"World." Some trade gurus opined that the WTO was not worthy of
its name until China, with 1.2 billion people, became a member.-° They were right, and
the same rationale applies to the Islamic world, with its comparable population. To be sure,
many Islamic countries already are WTO members-but (as discussed below) some promi-
nent ones are not. Those that hold membership are not necessarily integrated into the club
in the fullest degree.
D. ONLY JORDAN INVITED THUS FAR
Highlighting countries influenced by Liberal Reformism, and possibly also those swayed
by Neo-Traditional Reformism, and sending off sincere invitations to them, does not seem
to be on the agenda of American trade officials. The paralysis has not been complete-but
nearly so. It is true that on the eve of the Doha Conference, the USTR wrote of the Hull-
type link between trade liberalization and advancing the causes of political reform and
economic growth.OS Yet, the link was spelled out more for the benefit of a Congress hesitant
to grant trade-negotiating authority to the President than for the benefit of an Islamic world
(or parts thereof) dubious about how it fits into the multilateral trading system. The em-
phasis is understandable in the calculus of inside-the-Beltway trade politics, but it hardly
matters in that "other" world. Thus, today, the only invitee embraced with any warmth by
the United States is Jordan.
The United States signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Jordan, which entered into
force on December 17, 2001 following President Bush's proclamation on December 7,
2001.106 Under it, tariff and non-tariff barriers on almost all agricultural and industrial
products traded between the two countries will be eliminated within ten years, 10 7 with the
longest phase-out period for the tariffs currently at the highest levels. °8 The pact also
reduces barriers to trade in services (especially finance, telecommunications, couriers, and
energy distribution), and mandates adherence to international standards for intellectual
property rights. 1°9
However, from the perspective of Liberal Reformists and Neo-Traditional Reformists,
especially those in Arab countries, surely three facts about the Jordan FTA are telling. First,
the FTA came about more than fifteen years after America's first FTA with another country
in the Middle East-Israel. The Israel-United States FTA was signed on April 22, 1985110
104. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon, 15 AM. UNIV. INT'L L. REv. 1469, 1480 (2000).
105. See Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror with Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35. The appli-
cation of the argument to Congress was not well-received by the ranking Democrat on the House Ways and
Means Committee, Charles Rangel, who accused the U.S. Trade Representative of questioning the patriotism
of opponents of fast-track negotiating authority. The Trade Representative disclaimed that implication. See
Trading Barbs, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at 15; Jim Landers, Trade-Terrorism Rbetoric Faulted, DALAs MORN-
ING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, at ID.
106. See Bilateral Breaks: President Signs Proclamation to Bring U.S.-Jordan FTA Into Effect on Dec. 17, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2006 (Dec. 13, 2001) [hereinafter President Signs].
107. Id.
108. Specifically, there are four broad categories for eliminating industrial tariffs: (1) existing tariffs below
5 percent are phased out in two years, (2) existing tariffs between 5 and 10 percent are phased out in 4 years,
(3) existing tariffs between 10 and 20 percent are phased out in five years, and (4) existing tariffs over 20 percent
are phased out in 10 years. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Signs Free-Trade Pact with Jordan that Includes Labor,
Environment Rules, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1653 (Oct. 26, 2000).
109. See Yerkey, US. Signs, supra note 108, at 1653.
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and both houses of Congress passed implementing legislation signed by President Reagan
on June 11, 1985.1', The Jordan deal remains America's only FTA with an Arab nation or
with any Islamic nation."'
Second, the Jordan FTA is commercially insignificant, and economically unthreatening
to the United States. In 2000, the United States exported $306 million worth of goods to
Jordan, while Jordan exported $73 million to the United States." 3 These statistics evince a
large bilateral trade surplus that the FTA is unlikely to dent. The International Trade
Commission confirmed that lack of a threat. Its report"4 concluded the FTA would have
no measurable impact on American exports, given the insignificant share of American ex-
ports to Jordan relative to total American exports ($270 million and $642 billion, respec-
tively, in 1999). As for imports, there would be no measurable impact, save for one sector-
textiles and apparel-where Jordanian imports would rise. Yet, the overall impact on im-
ports into, and production and employment in, the United States due to the rise in Jor-
danian textiles and apparel imports would be negligible, because of the small share of Jor-
danian imports in total to American imports ($31 million versus $1 trillion in 1999).
Liberal Reformists and Neo-Traditional Reformists might say the United States sacri-
ficed nothing by entering into an FTA with Jordan. Indeed, they might note (with a touch
of cynicism) that the pact contains a safeguard clause to guard against import surges of a
particular commodity by "snapping back" the pre-pact level of protection (the remedy is
not one-sided, as Jordan could invoke it)."II Also, they might point to usage of the FTA
"Breaux-Cardin" rule of origin for textile and apparel products, specifically certain fabric
products, and silk handkerchiefs and scarves." 6 That rule deems the country of origin of
such products to be the country in which the base fabric is knit and woven." 7 The rule
shifts backward in the multi-step production process (growing or cultivation of fiber, spin-
ning of yarn from fiber, knitting and weaving of yarn to make fabric, cutting and sewing of
fabric, and final assembly of cut and sewn pieces) the key event determining origin. The
further back the dispositive event, the more protectionist the origin rule. Hence, the Re-
formists could point out, duty-free treatment would not be given to these products from
Jordan, unless they were made of fabric knit and woven in Jordan.
The third telling fact is that the delivery of the invitation to Jordan was contentious.
Negotiating the FTA led to a polarized debate, though less so with the Jordanians than
with Congress, over labor and environmental provisions." 8 With theJordanians, the agree-
110. See Bhala, supra note 52, at 58.
111. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 107TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S.
TRADE STATUTES 262 (Comm. Print June 2001) [hereinafter OVERVIEW]. The implementing legislation, the
United States - Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112.
112. In 1995, Congress delegated to the President proclamation authority to modify tariffs on products from
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and industrial zones between Israel and Egypt and Israel andJordan. This delegation
took the form of an amendment to the Israel FTA (discussed below). See OVERVIEW, supra note 111, at 264-
65.
113. See President Signs, supra note 106.
114. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC IMPACT ON ThE UNITED STATES OF A U.S. -
JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, No. 3340 (Sept. 2000).
115. See Yerkey, U.S. Signs, supra note 108, at 1653.
116. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Near Completion of Talks on Bilateral Free-Trade Pact, Sources Say, 17
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1574 (Oct. 12, 2000).
117. Id.
118. See Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Tells Abdullab He Will Push Hill to Adopt Jordan Free-Trade Agreement, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 632 (Apr. 19, 2001).
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ment to start negotiations was announced by President Clinton and King Abdullah on June
6, 2000.119 Negotiations finished, and the FTA was signed, on October 24, 2000.120 Presi-
dent Clinton sent the FTA to Congress on January 6, 2001,121 and the Senate passed the
pact on September 24, 2001,122 following House passage on July 31, 2001.123 Because the
Clinton administration negotiated the FTA, the views of its labor and environmental sup-
porters were manifest by the inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in the text of
the FTA itself. The Jordanians acquiesced, but the Republicans in Congress did not drop
the matter quietly.
Movement of these provisions from side agreements, to which they were relegated in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the main body of the document,
was of great symbolic significance. Republicans in Congress feared a precedent was being
set by the change of position, 12 4 which was the first time in American trade law history that
provisions on the enforcement of labor and environmental rights were placed in the main
body of a trade pact.125 Worse yet, the provisions called for the imposition by one country
of "appropriate or commensurate"126 measures-possibly meaning trade sanctions, but per-
haps also including fines or decreases in foreign aid27-against the other country if the
second country violated its own labor or environmental laws. 128 These measures would
follow a decision of a three-person arbitral panel, which would be selected (one member
by the United States, one member by Jordan, and the third member by mutual agreement)
to rule on any dispute. 129 The President would ultimately decide any measures to be imposed
by the United States. Republican opposition was overcome in part by letters from the USTR
to the Jordanians in which the USTR stated its intention to not invoke these enforcement
procedures in a way that would block trade. "0 The September 11 th attacks virtually ensured
Republicans would support the FTA, notwithstanding the labor and environmental pro-
visions and their centrality in the text, because they saw Jordan as an ally in counter-
terrorism."'
119. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Make "Substantial" Progress in Talks on Free Trade Agreement, USTR
Says, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1224 (Aug. 3, 2000).
120. See Yerkey, US. Signs, supra note 108, at 1653.
121. See Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Sends Congress Bill to Implement Jordan Free-Trade Pact witb Jordan,
18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 80 (Jan. 11, 2001).
122. See Gary G. Yerkey, Senate Approves Free Trade Pact with Jordan, Clearing Way for Enactment, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1533 (Sept. 27, 2001).
123. See Rossella Brevetti, Senate Panel, House Approve Measure on Jordan FTA, but Gramm Still Dissatisfied,
18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1244 (Aug. 2, 2001)
124. See Breveti, Senate Panel, House Approve, supra note 123; Gary G. Yerkey, House Democrats Hail "Pre-
cedent" Set By Labor, Environmental Clauses in Jordan FTA, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1685 (Nov.
2, 2000).
125. See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Vows to Work for Compromise between GOP, Democrats on Jordan FTA, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 554 (Apr. 5, 2001).
126. See Rossella Brevem, Gramm Vows to Block Jordan FTA Unless Sovereignty Concerns Addressed, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1159 (July 19, 2001).
127. See Rossella Brevetti, Baucus Sees Flexibility in Language on Environment, Labor in Jordan FTA, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 757 (May 10, 2001).
128. See Yerkey, Senate Approves, supra note 122.
129. See Yerekey, U.S. Signs, supra note 108. One senior trade official from the United States indicated the
dispute resolution mechanism was more informal than that contained in the DSU or NAFTA, and modeled
after the procedures in America's FTA with Israel. See id.
130. See Brevetti, Senate Panel, House Approve, supra note 123, and Yerkey, Senate Approves, supra note 122.
131. See Yerkey, Senate Approves, supra note 122.
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The history of the Israel-United States FTA is a contrast not lost on Islamic reformists.132
The Israelis originally proposed a bilateral FTA in 1981. On November 29, 1983, President
Reagan and Prime Minister Shamir agreed to commence negotiations, which began in
earnest in mid-January 1984. These negotiations were conducted by the USTR pursuant
to the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, wherein Congress delegated authority to the executive
branch to enter into the negotiations. Labor and environmental issues did not snag the
negotiations, and no provisions on these issues were included in the final text. To be sure,
the linkages between trade and labor, and between trade and the environment, were not as
politically prominent in the early and mid 1980s as they would become at the turn of the
millennium. Still, they could not have been unknown during the negotiations with Israel.
E. EIGHT SNUBS?
What has happened in the period since the Jordan FTA entered into force?' 33 Arguably,
little progress on invitations to Islamic countries has been made. To the contrary, the record
of American trade law toward the Islamic world could be characterized, not entirely unfairly,
as one of more snubs than invitations.
Consider the following eight points as they might be seen through the eyes of trade
officials from Muslim countries.
(1) No Other FTAs: The United States has eschewed-consciously or not--commence-
ment of ETA negotiations with other Islamic countries. Egypt is an obvious, commercially
significant, and highly strategic candidate. Its political and cultural influence in many parts
of the Arab world is enormous. Egypt could be the anchor for a Middle East FTA into
which the existing pacts with Israel and Jordan could be folded. Twenty-six Senators have
supported these ideas, yet no substantial progress has been made beyond a Trade and In-
vestment Framework Agreement (TIFA) between the United States and Egypt signed in
1999,14 and an expression of interest by the United States in November 2001 to start
talks.13'
(2) Lack of Inclusiveness in the WTO membership: Of the 144 WTO member countries, a
rough estimate is that only twenty are Muslim, or about 14 percent of the membership.136
132. This history, as well as an explanation of the agreement and the implementing legislation, are set forth
in OVERVIEW, supra note 111, at 262-64.
133. See generally CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPEITION (Bernard Hoekman &Jamel Zarrouck eds., 2000)
(containing economic essays on regional trade integration in the Middle East); TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTs
IN THE MIDDLE EAsT AND NoaRT AFRICA (Bernard Hoekman & Hanaa Kheir-EI-Din eds.,2000) (containing
economic essays on trade and investment in the Middle East).
134. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Egypt Agree to Seek "Framework"for Eventual Free Trade and Investment, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 555 (Apr. 5, 2001); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Senators Urge President Clinton to
Negotiate Free-Trade Pact with Egypt, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1255 (Aug. 10, 2000).
135. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Wants FTA Talks with Egypt, Links Trade to Global War on Terrorism, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1806 (Nov. 8, 2001). The Clinton administration discussed the idea of an FTA
with three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (but not Libya), and USTR Zoellick also men-
tioned this possibility on his January 2002 trip in Morocco. The United States has a TWFA with Morocco, and
one with Algeria as well (the latter, signed in July 2001, is posted on the USTR's Web site at www.ustr.gov).
See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Zoellick Plans Travel to Africa, Latin America, and Asia in Coming Weeks, 19 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 177 (Jan. 31, 2002). However, no material progress has been announced on turning
this FTA idea into a reality. In addition, Turkey has proposed a preferential trading arrangement with the
United States, but again no concrete action appears to have occurred toward realizing this goal. See Gary G.
Yerkey, Turkish Leader Proposes Trade Pact with U.S. to Cut Tariffi, Non-Tariff Barriers, 19 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 118 (Jan. 24, 2002).
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The Islamic countries that have not acceded yet to the WTO are Afghanistan, Algeria,
Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Yemen.' To be sure, it is important not to stretch this point. It cannot be inferred
that Muslims as people, as distinct from sovereign Islamic states, are under-represented.
The largest Muslim countries in the world-Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and
Egypt-are members, accounting for 207, 135, 128, 64, and 63 million people,"' s respec-
tively, or nearly 600 million of the 1.2 billion Muslims. Tens of millions more Muslims
living in non-Muslim countries like China and India are represented through the mem-
bership of those countries. The point is that if the count is by sovereign states, there is
reason for concern about inclusiveness, especially given some of the prominent Islamic
states-such as Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (all discussed below)-that remain outside the
club.
(3) Blockage ofIranian Accession: The rise to power of a cautious modernizer in Iran (Pres-
ident Mohammad Khatami) bespeaks the influence of Liberal Reformism in that country,
and suggests Iran might be a good candidate for WTO membership. That membership
could encourage economic liberalization, and foster trade linkages that re-integrate it into
the community of peaceful, prosperous nations. Yet, a strategic opportunity is not how the
United States approaches Tehran's interest in the WTO. (To the contrary, Iran is said to
be part of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. 39) To join the WTO, a
working party needs to be established to negotiate terms of accession, and the General
Council (which operates by consensus) must agree to form the working party.- ° Iran applied
to join in 1996. The initial American response was to block the General Council from even
considering formation of a working party.' 4' In May 2001, the United States agreed to
placement of the issue on the agenda. But, on the ground it is reviewing the matter inter-
nally, presumably a euphemistic way of stating its suspicion of Iran's support for terrorism,
the United States continues to block approval of Iran's request to establish a working
party. 42 Supported by Israel, but opposed by the EU, the United States formally blocked
Iran's application again in February 2002.141
136. I count as "Islamic" those countries with a Muslim population of 66 percent or higher, as set forth in
THE OxFoaD HISTORY OF ISLAM x 0ohn L. Esposito ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (containing a handy map,
"The World of Islam - Distribution of World Population"). Accordingly, the Islamic countries included are:
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brunei; Egypt; Gambia; Guinea; Indonesia;
Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Kuwait; Libya; Mali; Mauritania; Morocco; Oman; Pakistan; Qatar; Saudi
Arabia; Syria; Tajikistan; Tunisia; Turkey, Turkmenistan; United Arab Emirates; Uzbekistan; and Yemen.
137. In July 2001, the WTO General Council accepted the application for membership from Tajikistan,
and established a working party on accession to negotiate membership terms. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Accepts
membership Applications from Bahamas, Tajikistan; Delays on Iran, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1200
Ouly 26, 2001).
138. See THE WORLD BAN, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2001, Table 1.1, "Size of the Economy,"
at 12-14 (2002) (1999 data).
139. See George Bush and the Axis of Evil, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, at 13. Of course, the EU disagrees with
the characterization. See Judy Dempsey, Europeans Rqect Bush "Axis of Evil" Line on Iran, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2002, at 4.
140. See Bhala, Enter the Dragon, supra note 104, at 1471-74.
141. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Blocks Iranian WTO Application; Syria Prevented from Placement on Agenda, 19
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 36 (Jan. 3, 2002).
142. See Guy Dinmore & Frances Williams, Iran Signals WTO Hopes, FIN. TIMEs, May 9, 2001, at 9; Pruzin,
U.S. Blocks Iranian WIO Application, supra note 141.
143. See Frances Williams, Iran's Bid to Join W7O is Blocked by U.S., FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at 5.
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(4) Blockage of Syrian and Libyan Accessions. The rise to power of a purported modernizer
in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad, may be a hopeful sign of influence of Liberal Reformists
in that country. So, too, may be Syria's indication in October 2001 that it would like to
join the WTO. The United States blocked the General Council from putting on the agenda
the question of formation of an accession working party. It appears to have done so because
of Syria's support for the Arab League boycott of Israel.'4 The United States has taken the
same position on Libya's request for WTO membership-blockage, presumably out of
concern for Libya's support for this boycott.15 In both cases, the American position is at
odds with that of the EU, which supports the Syrian and Libyan accession moves. Indeed,
the EU is going so far as to negotiate a trade association accord with Syria, which is part
of a grander design to create a Europe-Mediterranean FTA by 2010.'4
(5) Hesitancy toward the Palestinians: The United States has told the Palestinian Authority
that, given tensions with Israel, it would not be appropriate for the Authority to gain WTO
observer status. 47 That status would be an initial step toward possible membership.
(6) No Real Progress on Saudi Accession: It is not clear how the debate in Saudi Arabia
about the nature and pace of economic reform will play out; and, in particular, whether
Traditional Reformism will triumph.' 48 The strategic argument for including Saudi Arabia
in the WTO is encouragement of Liberal Reformists, or at least Neo-Traditional Reform-
ists, who in turn will protect the oil flowing from one quarter of the world's proven re-
serves. 49 The Kingdom applied to join the GATT in July 1993, though little progress was
made in accession negotiations until the birth of the WTO on January 1, 1995.10 Since
then, talks have bogged down over the terms. On the one hand, the United States (and
other developed- country WTO members) wants market access the Saudis appear unwilling
to provide, because of a threat to the birth of infant industries that might help wean their
economy off of its present dependence on oil, and a fear of an invasion of western culture
embedded in imported goods and services that would undermine Islamic values. More than
just maintenance of an import ban on alcohol and pork is at stake.'' In March 2001, the
Saudis produced a broad "negative list" of industrial and service sectors that would be off
limits to foreign companies: all insurance and reinsurance businesses; telecommunications
(public telecom, data and message transmission, and business network services); wholesale
trade; retail distribution; auto dealerships and auto parts outlets; road and air transport
(passenger and freight); audiovisual businesses (film and video production and distribution,
cinemas, radio, and television); printing and publishing; education; nursing and paramedical
services; real estate commission businesses; and, of course, oil exploration and production,
and pipeline transport." 2 On the other hand, perhaps the United States is chary of what
144. See Daniel Pruzin, Syria to Seek WTO membership; Objections of U.S., Israel Expected, 18 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 44, at 1806 (Nov. 8, 2001).
145. See Williams, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. See Pruzin, Syria, supra note 144.
148. See Roula Khalaf, A Wind of Change Must Rise in Riyadh, Says Prince, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at 14.
149. See Robin Allen, Saudis Blame "Unique Status"for Delays in Joining WT0, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 2000,
at 8.
150. See Frances Williams, Saudis Start Talks on joining the 9W70, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at 4.
151. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Push Saudis to Improve Market Access Offers for WTO Entry, 17 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1654 (Oct. 26, 2000).
152. See Daniel Pruzin, Trade Officials Express Disappointment with Saudi Foreign Investment Exclusion List, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 446 (Mar. 15, 2001).
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Saudi Arabia could use: oil subject to the disciplines of trade law, including bound tariff
schedules, so its exports would not be subject to excessive or discriminatory import barriers.
(7) Lack of Representation in the WTO Secretariat: Of the 512.5 actual employees at the
WTO Secretariat, few are from Islamic countries. There are three Egyptians, one Mor-
occan, four Tunisians, and two Turks.' In other words, representation among employees
in the Secretariat from the Islamic world is about 2 percent. Of course, there may be
Muslims from non-Muslim countries (but that is not easy to ascertain from available
sources), and the point of working for the Secretariat is not to be a lobbyist for the interests
of one's own country. Still, the lack of nationals in the Secretariat from Indonesia, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh-the world's three largest Islamic countries-is stunning.
(8) Sanctions: It has been suggested America has a sanctions-based foreign policy,14
though former Senator Jesse Helms has disputed the charge that the United States is sanc-
tions happy.'"5 What is difficult to deny is that Islamic countries are frequent targets of
America's trade sanctions, particularly those taking aim at state-sponsored terrorism.'56 For
example, in August 2001, President Bush agreed to an extension of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), which otherwise would have lapsed pursuant to a sunset
clause in that legislation, after both houses of Congress voted for the extension by a veto-
proof margin.' There is a vigorous and worldwide debate as to the efficacy of isolating
regimes in order to bring about a change in them, or their behavior, as opposed to con-
structively engaging them. 5 '
Certainly, whether these eight points are "snubs" is a matter of perspective and context.
Doubtless, American trade officials would claim to have made greater efforts at inviting
into the family of trading nations the Islamic countries. But, as is the case with developing
countries (discussed in Part II), there is the problem of perception and reality merging in
a fuzzy way. If one side sees itself being told it is not invited to share in the opportunities
from a liberal trade order, then that is a real problem the other side ignores at its peril.
Whatever the accuracy of the perception, the Islam Challenge is critical. Failure to meet
it is a second reason for abjuring the characterization of Doha as a "success." Extending
Secretary Hull's vision means linking (1) the integration into the trading system of Liberal
Reformist, and possibly also Neo-Traditional Reformist, Islamic countries, with (2) the
peace and security necessary for that system to operate. That link is not yet a feature of
American trade law as it relates to the Islamic world.
F. TE TILEs FROM PAxisTAN-A NINTH SNUB?
If there is one illustration that stands above all others as a missed opportunity to enhance
peace and stability by trying to integrate Liberal Reformist and (possibly) Neo-Traditional
153. See Overview of the WTO Secretariat, supra note 57 and THE OXFoRD HISTORY OF ISLAM, supra note 136.
154. See, e.g., Richard N. Haas, Sanctioning Madness, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 74 (Nov./Dec. 1997). See generaly Raj
Bhala, Mr. WATU Seven Steps to Trade Sanctions Analysis, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565 (1999) (suggesting a
doctrinal framework for the analysis of sanctions legislation).
155. See Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic? 78 FoREIGN AFi. (Jan./Feb. 1999).
156. For a discussion of the various sanction regimes and countries affected, see U.S. INT'L TRADE Com-
MISSION, OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT U.S. UNILATERAL EcoNoMIc SANCTIONS, pub. 3124, investi-
gation 332-391, 1-8-11 and Table 1-3 at 1-12-13 (Aug. 1998).
157. See Gary G. Yerkey, President Signs Five-Year Extension ofILSA as BusinessesAgain Protest, 18 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1276 (Aug. 9, 2001). See generally Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade
Law, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 86-115 (1997) (discussing ILSA).
158. Several of the studies are discussed in Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys, supra note 157, at 116-21.
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Reformist Islamic countries into the multilateral trading system, then surely it comes from
the textile and apparel sector. The record of the United States roughly contemporaneously
with the Doha Conference is one of hardly budging on market access. That record may
redound to the detriment of the United States.
Happily, Uruguay Round negotiators laid down a route-the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC)-that will soon lead to a world that looks more like free trade than it does
now. Under the ATC, the system of quotas enshrined in the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA)
is being dismantled. All WTO members are obligated to phase out these quotas in stages,
with the final elimination on December 31, 2004.159 But, more than efficiency is at stake,
otherwise, rapid eradication of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the textile and apparel sector
would have been the result of talks during the previous Round.
Also at stake are the adjustment costs faced by workers in each country that has a textile
and apparel sector. Many Islamic countries with textile and apparel industries maintain high
trade barriers against competing products. 16° No doubt in the Ricardian world, immediate
and mutually beneficial trade concessions would be the efficient outcome. But, as is apparent
from GATT, reciprocity is not required of developing and least-developed countries. Part
IV of the document embraces the principle of non-reciprocal trade liberalization for the
benefit of poor countries. In GATT article XXXVI:8, the developed country contracting
parties declare they "do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed
contracting parties. "1161 That is not to say encouraging poor countries to invigorate their
industries through exposure to competition is a dumb idea. Rather, it is to say that granting
them trade concessions is not contingent on their rapid implementation of the strategy.
Indeed, the 1979 Tokyo Round Enabling Clause enshrines a permanent waiver from the
MFN obligation of GATT article I,"02 so that rich countries may provide S & D treatment
to poor countries-and many, like the United States, do so to one degree or another, and
with exceptions of one sort or another.161
Indeed, rapid implementation of the strategy-specifically, insisting on swift eradication
of most or all of the barriers to textile and apparel imports in countries like Pakistan and
Bangladesh may be a dumb idea from the perspective of systemic security and stability.
Textiles and apparel are one of the most economically and socially strategic export sectors
in some Islamic countries, with these two countries--discussed in turn below-being ex-
amples. In each, these goods represent a sizeable percentage of total exports, and total export
earnings, in such countries.
In Pakistan, the textiles and apparel sector accounts for over half of the country's ex-
ports,14 and is an important source of employment for men and women (and, in instances
159. See ATC Agreement, art. 9, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 348, 362.
160. Pakistan, for example, has imposed on imported textiles and clothing unbound tariffs as high as 70
percent. See Chris Rugaber, European Commission Proposes Benefits, More Market Access for Pakistani Textiles, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1651 (Oct. 18, 2001).
161. GAiT Article XXXVI:8, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 245.
162. See Decision on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Devel-
oping Countries (28th November 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1980), reprinted in HANDBOOK,
supra note 52, at 257-29.
163. See TRADE, GRowTH, AND INJUSTIcE, supra note 55.
164. Edward Luce & Mark Nicholson, Pakistan Looks for Better Deal on Textile _&ports, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2001, at 4.
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where additional family income sources are needed, children). Pakistan is rightly proud of
its world-class cotton, which it boasts is as fine or better than Egyptian cotton.'65 Earnings
generated by families working in the textiles and apparel sector in Muslim societies are
linked directly to social stability in those societies and, in turn, to America's national se-
curity. Their earnings are one defense they have against succumbing to the temptation of
religiously extreme messages, and against unsavory and unlawful jobs like narcotics traf-
ficking and prostitution. The Commerce Minister of Pakistan, Abdul Razak Dawood, put
it directly: "If you want Pakistan to be a liberal and modern state you are not going to get
that unless you've got people employed... Unemployment leads to militancy." 66
The threat of militancy and the earnings defense against it run from this generation of
Pakistani workers to its progeny. Earnings from textile and apparel jobs are used by many
lower and middle-class Pakistani families to pay tuition for academically sound private
schools for their children, i.e., to avoid a situation in which these families have no choice
but to send their kids to an academically sub-standard madrasa (religious school)."6 That
kind of school is likely to be financed privately (sometimes by interests in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf region), and may well promulgate extremist and anti-American messages to the
young and dispossessed.1
s
Obviously, the earnings of families employed in the textile and apparel sector in countries
like Pakistan hinge critically on the sales of the products they make, particularly sales over-
seas to major consuming countries like the United States. Market access to the United
States for their work product is a necessary-but by no means sufficient-condition for
successfully combating the seductions of extremism, violence, and red-light occupations.
Alarmingly, "[als a direct consequence of the political uncertainty caused by the American
bombing of Afghanistan, Pakistan's textile industry is losing orders from American com-
panies"' 69 and in the eight weeks following September 11, overseas orders fell dramatically,
and Pakistani textile companies had laid off 10,000-12,000 workers. 170 In brief, the point
is that market access for textile and apparel products from countries like Pakistan is good
not only for American consumers (who gain from a broader array of lesser-priced clothes
than they would have if living behind protectionist walls), but also for their safety.
To be sure, increased market access for Pakistan means adjustment costs for some Amer-
icans-those who work in the textile and apparel sector that produce like or directly com-
petitive products with the imports from countries like Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of
jobs have disappeared from this sector over the last several years, and 90,000 lost between
roughly April 2000 and October 2001.' 7 Yet, it is a hard utilitarian balancing calculation
165. The observations recorded below are gathered not only from my trip to Pakistan in March 2001, but
also from discussions with a number of Pakistani trade lawyers, scholars, and students during the last four
years.
166. Luce & Nicholson, Pakistan Looks, supra note 164.
167. See THOMAS W. LIPPMAN, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM 187 (2nd rev'd ed.1995) (defining "madrasa" as a
"[rleligious school, where boys of high-school age study the Koran, Islamic law, and related subjects"). See also
JOHN L. EsPosITo, ISLAM - THE STRAIGHT PATH 220 (expanded ed. 1991) (defining "madrasa" as a "religious
college or university, seminary").
168. Certainly, not every madrasa bears these dubious distinctions.
169. Open Up to Pakistan, WASH. PosT, Oct. 31, 2001, at A26.
170. See Chris Rugaber, U.S. Textile Group Condemns Proposals by Administration to Cut Pakistan Tariffi, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1792 (Nov. 8, 2001).
171. See Rugaber, U.S. Textile Group, supra note 170.
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of a net benefit in which national security, as well as sectoral economic, factors are weighed.
Are many domestic textile and apparel jobs at risk anyway, and have they been so for years,
given the slippage of comparative advantage to low-wage countries? Is the risk inevitably
going to increase in 2005, when the ATC assures that all import quota restrictions in the
textile and apparel sector around the world will be removed, so that there will be a global
free market in these products? Is the tariff spike imposed by the United States on Pakistani
textiles-15 percent' .--coupled with an array of quotas a contributing factor to unem-
ployment in Pakistan? What monstrous repercussions might follow from a collapse in Pa-
kistan's textile and apparel sector? In sum, upon whom does it make more sense-from a
broad perspective-to impose the adjustment costs?
The current national security context suggests a strong rationale in favor of granting
favorable market access to textile and apparel products from Pakistan. There are yet two
additional facts that would favor this approach in America's trade law: (1) Pakistan has been
a loyal ally in the post-September 11 war against terrorism; and (2) the United States lost
a textiles safeguards case to Pakistan in the WTO. Despite these facts, however, the United
States has hardly budged on increased market access for textiles and apparel goods from
these countries. The veracity and impact of the first fact is obvious, and no elaboration is
needed. All that need be underscored is that whatever one might think of the way in which
President Pervez Musharraf came to power in the fall 1999, he has risked his and his
country's future on siding with the United States against Islamic extremism, and the courage
to take these risks ought to merit a significant return.
The second fact concerns one of the less-well known recent cases, United States--Tran-
sitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan,' initiated by Pakistan in
April 2000. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate Body's report in
November 2001. The Appellate Body held the United States committed two fatal mistakes
in its unilateral imposition of a transitional safeguard action against combed cotton yarn
from Pakistan. First, the United States wrongly excluded from the scope of the domestic
industry subject to analysis the American combed cotton yarn producers that are vertically
integrated and make the yarn for their own internal use. That overly narrow delineation of
the domestic industry was a violation of article 6(2) of the ATC.114 Second, the United
States did not examine the effect of imports from Mexico (and possibly other WTO mem-
bers) individually when coming to the conclusion that serious damage to the domestic
172. See Open Up, supra note 169. See aso Rugaber, U.S. Textile Group, supra note 170 (reporting an ap-
proximate 12 percent tariff on Pakistani textile and apparel imports).
173. WT DS192/AB/R (adopted November 5, 2001). For a brief summary of the case, see Update of WTO
Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/4, 88-90 (Feb. 6,2002). For an extended analysis, see Raj Bhala & David
Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 ARIzoNA J. INT'L & CoMp. L. (forthcoming 2002).
174. Article 6:2 states:
Safeguard action may be taken... when, on the basis of a determination by a member, it is demon-
strated that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to
cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or directly com-
petitiveproducts. Serious damage or actual threat thereof must demonstrably be caused by such increased
quantities in total imports of that product and not by such other factors as technological changes or
changes in consumer preference.
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Makkakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter ATC}, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 356 (emphasis added).
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industry in the United States could be attributed to Pakistani imports. That defect in the
causation analysis was a violation of Article 6(4) of the ATC. 11
Having received steadfast support in a shooting war, and lost a trade law battle, it would
be logical for Pakistan to expect the United States to be willing to open its textile and
apparel market to Pakistani goods in more generous ways than called for under the ATC.
That is, based on these two facts, the Pakistanis would not be unreasonable to think that
they might not have to wait until 2005 for duty-free, quota-free treatment for their exports.
As the Washington Post proclaimed in an editorial, "If ever there was a case for immediate
trade liberalization, American barriers to Pakistani textile exports are it."176 Indeed, the EU
quickly decided to grant Pakistan $1.35 billion in help by (1) eliminating all tariffs on
Pakistani clothing exports (which account for 60 percent of Pakistan's exports to the EU),
and (2) increasing the quota allotments by 15 percent for Pakistani textiles and clothing
shipped to the EU.17 Interestingly, Pakistan agreed to reduce its tariffs on EU textiles and
clothing by 5 percent, and establish lower binding rates:
Yet, according to the Wall StreetJournal, here is what happened at Doha on the matter:
[A] U.S. trade official made an offer that he said Pakistan shouldn't refuse.
If Islamabad signed on to the U.S. negotiating line here at the World Trade Organization
ministerial meeting, Commerce Undersecretary Grant Aldonis told Pakistan's Commerce
Minister that America would consider slightly easing its restrictions on imports of bed sheets
and pillowcases from Pakistan. In addition, Mr. Aldonis said, the U.S. also would be willing to
lift a 1998 quota on cotton yarn. He also said the U.S. couldn't lower tariffs on Pakistani
textiles for fear of angering House Ways and Means Chairman Rep. Bill Thomas (R., Calif.),
whose congressional district includes a big cotton manufacturer.
The Pakistani negotiators looked at Mr. Aldonis in astonishment. The WTO already had
ruled in April that the U.S. quota on cotton yarn was illegal, so America had to lift it anyway.
And bed sheets and pillowcases? Given that Pakistan has lost 40% of its U.S. exports since
Sept. 11, when frightened American buyers halted orders from the front-line country, Mr.
Alodonis's lowball offer was "totally inexplicable," one Pakistani negotiator said. "We told him,
'Please don't announce this to anyone. It will insult our intelligence to pretend this is a conces-
sion.'"lTS8
Why the insult to the intelligence of the Pakistani trade negotiators? As the account sug-
gests, the answer lies in domestic political pressures, specifically, the perceived need to
175. Article 6:4 states:
Any measure invoked pursuant to... this Article shall be applied on a member-by-member basis. The
member or members to whom serious damage, or actual threat thereof ... is attributed, shall be
determined on the basis of a sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or imminent, from such
a member or members individually, and on the basis of the level of imports as compared with imports from
other sources, market share, and import and domestic prices at a comparable stage of commercial trans-
action; none of these factors, either alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily give decisive
guidance. Such safeguard measure shall not be applied to the exports of any member whose exports of
the particular product are already under restraint under this Agreement.
Id. at Art. 6:4, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 356-57 (emphasis added).
176. Open Up to Pakistan, supra note 169.
177. See Open Up to Pakistan, supra note 169; Rugaber, European Commission, supra note 160; Francesco
Guerrera, Islamabad Rewarded by Brussels Trade Package, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at 4.
178. Helene Cooper & Geoff Winestock, Domestic Demands Limit US., EUBargainingat Trade Talks, WA.L
ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A24 (emphasis added).
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procure votes in Congress from textile-producing states. The narrow special interest of
America's textile and apparel industry has inhibited movement toward a sensible, long-term
security strategy on trade concessions in the sector.
What, then, did Pakistan get from the United States? A one billion dollar financial aid
package, plus rescheduling of $379 million of debt, $300 million in financing and political
risk insurance for direct investment in Pakistan (through the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation), support for a new loan facility from the International Monetary Fund, and
for new development bank facilities (through the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank), and a waiver of sanctions imposed after Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998.179
These moves are hardly insignificant. But, the package did not include any significant con-
cessions in the sector about which Pakistan cared most-textiles and apparel.
Pakistan asked for an additional $1.4 billion in textile and apparel export sales to the
United States. s0° The boost in sales, said Pakistan, could be had through suspension of all
tariffs on apparel until 2005, and large increases in quotas for key exports (e.g., cotton shirts
and trousers). Pakistan got a deal valued at 10 percent of its request-about $160 million
annually. The United States refused to lift any duties. It agreed to raise quota thresholds
in seven categories by 15 percent, and to include flexibility for Pakistan to use unfilled
quotas in other categories. Not surprisingly, the quotas affected were ones in which Paki-
stani merchandise is not like or directly competitive with products made in the United
States.
G. AND TENTH-WHAT ABOUT POOR BANGLADESH?
To sum up so far, there are a number of points in support of an argument that the United
States has yet to work out a clear link between better integration of some parts of the
Islamic World into the trading system, and the realization of Secretary Hull's vision of trade
as an instrument for promoting peace and stability. As discussed earlier, these points are
the lack of FTAs with Muslim countries (save for Jordan), eight events that could be per-
ceived as snubs, and what may be characterized as an ungrateful, or at least unenlightened,
snub of Pakistan's textile and apparel sector. There is one final illustration of what looks to
be a continuing failure of American trade law to meet the Islam Challenge: the asymmetric
treatment received by Bangladesh in the ready-made garment (RMG) sector, in comparison
with other least-developed countries. 10
The RMG sector is significant to the Bangladesh economy. It employs about 2 million
workers, all non-union, and 80 percent of who are women. The 3,000-3,500 RMG factories
179. Chris Rugaber, Pakistan to Receive $1 Billion in Aid; Textile Duty Reductions Not Included, 18 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1828 (Nov. 15, 2001).
180. Pakistan's request and the terms of the deal are drawn from Edward Alden, Pakistan Rewarded with
ApparelMarket Deal, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at6. See also Edward Alden, Bush Aid Offer May Dismay Pakistan,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002 (noting strong pressure from the American textile and apparel industry against any
sizeable concessions).
181. The observations presented are drawn from my visit to two RMG factories in Dhaka on 8 December
2001, and two meetings, in Washington, D.C. on 14 November 2001 and Dhaka on 2 December 2001, with
Mr. Kutubuddin Ahmed, President, Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association
("BGMEA"). I am grateful to Mr. Ahmed and the BGMEA for the excellent cooperation and instruction they
provided to me. Some of the information is drawn from discussions with present and former U.S. government
officials familiar with the Bangladesh economy, to who I am grateful. The data set forth above is as of year-
end 2001, and any statistical or interpretative errors are mine.
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mass-produce apparel for domestic and overseas markets. Regarding the latter, RMGs ac-
count for about 75 percent of Bangladesh's exports. Yet, Bangladeshi workers are feeling
the pressures of cross-border competition.
On average, for one dozen shirts, wholesale importers from the EU used to pay Ban-
gladeshi RMG exporters U.S. $5.50. However, more and more capitalists from developing
countries-not just within Bangladesh, but also Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and even some Per-
sian Gulf countries-have entered in the RMG business. China is another major producer
of RMGs, and about 86 percent of Japan's RMG imports come from China. Thus, the
wholesale price offered by EU buyers has fallen to $3.50 per dozen shirts. At that price,
about 60 percent of the Bangladeshi RMG mass-production facilities barely break even,
and many others have closed. The closures force many of the redundant workers into
prostitution or narcotics trafficking, both monstrous social externalities and potential causes
of unrest.
The plummet in world-market wholesale RMG prices obviously is due to severe com-
petition among RMG factories in Bangladesh, and between Bangladeshi and foreign fac-
tories. The severity of the competition is not surprising. It is inexpensive to set up an RMG
factory. In Bangladesh, it costs about U.S. $200,000 to set up one and employ 300 workers
for an entire year. In contrast, it costs about $40-$50 million to establish a textile factory
in Bangladesh to produce fabric used to manufacture RMGs. Small wonder why there are
so few textile factories there, and why Bangladeshi RMG capitalists import fabric from low-
cost suppliers like China and India. In contrast to the Chinese and Indian capitalists, Ban-
gladeshi entrepreneurs lack adequate funding to establish what are called "backward link-
ages," i.e., to own and control raw material and intermediate good inputs into the RMG
production process, and thereby establish a vertically integrated production process.
So, how do the Bangladeshi RMG producers stay in business? First, owners of RMG
factories contain labor costs as best they can against pressures from foreign union repre-
sentatives operating in Bangladesh, and presumably also seek to delay the day when the
sector becomes unionized. The result is wage suppression or depression, and only about
10 percent of the roughly 3,000 RMG factories in Bangladesh pay good wages. Costs also
are minimized through other, less direct means. For example, hours can be extended beyond
the eight-hour per day shift, with a maximum of two hours' overtime, which every factor
manager tells a visitor is the limit. Why not twelve hours, or even fourteen hours per day
at the same aggregate pay? Clearly, the result is a drop in wages per hour, and an increase
in output. Another possibility is to hire cheaper labor-and "cheaper" often means
"younger" workers paid a lower wage rate. Yes, it is true that Bangladesh has signed the
convention of the International Labor Organization (ILO) against child labor, which Ban-
gladesh authorities have made strides in compliance with the convention, and that, as of
October 2001, Bangladesh's RMG factories supposedly were 100 percent free of child labor.
Nevertheless, it is easy to spot the large numbers of young women on the streets of Dhaka
going to and from their factory jobs.' s2
182. During Ramadan (the Muslim Holy month when the recitations of the Koran to the Prophet Muham-
mad are said to have begun in 610 A.D., they can be seen coming out of the factories for Iftar - the breaking
of the daily sunrise-to-sunset fast. Maybe they are not "children," but they are evidently young girls.
Still another cost-cutting possibility concerns working conditions. Lighting, ventilation, sanitation, on-
premises health care stations, and training programs distinguish adequate from degrading RMG fac-
tories. So, too, do fire alarms and fire escapes. About 80-100 RMG workers died in factory fires over
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Another strategy for staying in business in an increasingly competitive global environ-
ment is to search for new markets overseas. Here is where American trade law, once again,
faces the Islam Challenge. Bangladeshi RMG manufacturers and exporters have benefited
from a system of quotas enshrined in the MFA. The MFA quotas ensured their product a
certain volume of exports to the EU, the United States, and other major markets. However,
with the final elimination of quotas called for by the ATC by December 31, 2004, the next
day will be one of global free trade in the textile and apparel sector (absent any remedial
actions). Bangladesh's RMG capitalists are nearly unanimous in their trepidation: how can
they possibly compete with the likes of low-cost Chinese and Indian producers, absent a
country-specific and garment-specific quota system? At least, they say, give them duty-free
access to the American (and, presumably, other) markets. After all, as Bangladesh is quick
to point out, every one of the WTO members that qualifies as a least-developed country
receives duty-free treatment for its RMG exports to the United States-save for RMGs
from Bangladesh. In brief, concerned about foreign competition, the Bangladeshi RMG
producer-exporters are lobbying the American government for a trade rule regime that will
favor their merchandise. 183
Should Bangladesh be awarded the change? To be sure, there are reasons-from the
American perspective-for pause. Consider the irony in what is being asked of the United
States. Was it not the case that the MFA quotas were adverse to the interests of many poor
countries? After all, the binding quota limits prevented developing countries from increas-
ing significantly their access to developed country markets. The limits motivated some
developing-country exporters to concoct illegal trans-shipment schemes whereby, for ex-
ample, Chinese garments would be routed to the United States through Thailand, and false
country-of-origin labels ("Made in Thailand") would be sewn on. (The U.S. Customs Ser-
vice spent considerable time and effort combating these schemes.) In asking for duty-free
treatment, Bangladesh's RMG producer-exporters are arguing for parity, i.e., for treatment
that is equal to that given by the United States to all other WTO least-developed members.
But, in seeking guaranteed quotas, or even expanded quota thresholds, Bangladesh's RMG
capitalists are arguing for a regime that has been viewed by many developing-country ad-
vocates as anathema.
In another sense, the concern about foreign competition among Bangladeshi producer-
exporters masks structural problems in Bangladesh that, were they addressed, would make
Bangladeshi RMGs better able to withstand the competition without compromising the
well-being of the labor force. Consider the fact that Bangladesh's principal port, at Chit-
tagong, is among the most expensive in the world. It can take a week to clear a shipment
of goods from the port, whereas at Singapore's port the time is a matter of a few hours.
On average, the costs of containers, freight, and letter-of-credit financing associated with
importing fabric and other items consumed in RMG production are 7 percent of the overall
a recent three- to four-year period. In these instances, many of the workers were locked in their
factories, and thus unable to flee the smoke and flames. Even less inhumane circumstances can pose a
threat. The floor space of some factories is congested with raw materials (e.g., rolls of fabric) and
cardboard boxes in which finished RMGs are placed for exports. Consequently, ingress and egress is
obstructed, and is especially problematic during a fire emergency. The obstructions themselves can be
fire hazards.
183. Unfortunately, the lobbying seems to have come late, after Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African ex-
porters had successfully pushed for the Trade and Development Act of 2000.
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cost of production of the finished product. A large part of the blame for the high costs has
nothing to do with a free trade. Corruption at the Chittagong port is the culprit. Private
and public sector officials of various stripes take their "fees," thus driving up production
costs. Who suffers? None other than the ladies in the RMG factories, because port cor-
ruption puts downward pressure on their wages and working conditions, in order to keep
the "bottom line" low.
The irony and the structural problems bespeak weaknesses in the Bangladeshi request to
the Bush Administration and Congress. Still another deficiency is that the final salvation of
the Bangladesh economy is not likely to come from RMG exports. Even though the RMG
sector constitutes 75 percent of Bangladesh's exports, it accounts for only about 25 percent
of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Thus, RMGs are not a high-value added prod-
uct. Plainly, diversification of the country's export base is needed to generate greater
amounts of hard-currency income, which can be used to invest in the economy. That di-
versification has long been underway in China and India. Neither of those countries is
staking its economic future on textiles and apparel. Rather, like Korea, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Taiwan, both China and India seek to industrialize through the manufacture of pro-
gressively higher-value added products. Consumer electronics, computer hardware and
software, and pharmaceuticals are examples. That is not to say Chinese and Indian indus-
trialists will abandon entirely the RMG market to their Bangladeshi counterparts, any more
than American textile and apparel manufacturers are quietly facing the prospect of the
closure of their remaining plants in the United States. However, the RMG sector is likely
to diminish in importance in China and India as they progress "up the food chain." In that
setting, the Bangladeshi entrepreneurs would be their country's own worst enemy if they
focus too much of the energy of their political leaders, and too large an amount of pro-
ductive resources, on the RMG sector.
Yet, the question about whether Bangladesh ought to be accorded the same preferences
that the other least-developed countries remains part of the Islam Challenge for American
trade law. Like Pakistan, though of less strategic and political and military importance in
the present War on Terrorism, Bangladesh pledged its support for America's efforts and
offered what assistance it could. 1 4 Like Pakistan, Bangladesh has had-and currently has-
a woman elected democratically as its leader. Even more so than Pakistan, Bangladesh is
dominated-for now, anyway-by political, religious, and social pacesetters opposed to
Traditional Reformism. Would, then, a trade law that essentially says "no" to the critical
textile and apparel sectors in the world's second and third largest Muslim countries advance
the vision articulated by Secretary Hull?
IV. Empathy and Humility
But with every problem there is an opportunity. We now have the chance to recast U.S. trade
policy in a manner that better prepares it for the challenges of the 21 st century and thus puts
it on a more sustainable footing with greater public support. We have no choice but to accept
that challenge. 15
184. Among the victims of September 11 were many Bangladeshis, some of whom apparently worked in the
former "Windows on the World" restaurant atop the World Trade Center.
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European Commission President Romano Prodi declared the DDA indicated the new
negotiating round "would not be one world against another but a shared agreement." 8 6 Is
he right? Two Challenges, Poverty and Islam, reflect two great schisms in global trade-
between rich and poor, and Muslim and non-Muslim.' If trade law is to liberalize trade,
and not be the tool for protectionist abuse, then these schisms must be narrowed. If they
are not narrowed, then surely Prodi will be wrong.
To say the dominant trading power must take the lead is not to take a position hostile to
American trade law. One motive for being provocative is to spotlight different perspectives,
and open up new policy options, in an area of passionate concern to the agent provocateur.
That is the motive behind this article. If its argument were that American trade policy is a
study in failure, then there would be a legitimate counter-attack. That argument would
make matters sound far worse than they are. But, if the argument is trade law has not met
the two Challenges, which it is, then it might be taken in the spirit in which it is meant-
constructive criticism.
Empathy is not agreement. Not every point put forward by every official from a devel-
oping or Islamic country about how trade law ought to be changed is correct. There is
rhetoric, even whining unmindful of self-inflicted wounds like domestic corruption. More
apologies for the Third World are unnecessary. Is it not a fact that of the twenty-four
poorest African countries that made economic reforms between 1990-1999, ten of them
endured wars and coups,' while bureaucracy, graft, and dreaded diseases plagued virtually
all of them? There is blame to go around, but pointing fingers is not the hallmark of good
lawyers. Rather, empathy is the indispensable quality for effective advocacy in any forum.
The WTO is no exception.
Likewise, humility is needed to avoid overstatement. It would be excessive to imply that
had the United States met successfully the Poverty and Islam Challenges, all or virtually
all of the outstanding substantive trade law issues would have been resolved at Doha. Who
can gainsay that there were, and still are, other obstacles in the way? Many WTO members
face domestic constituency pressures, coupled with internal government constraints, which
conspire against dramatic agreement to new multilateral trade agreements. In the United
States, the confederates--sometimes in concert, sometimes not-include many labor un-
ions, environmental lobbyists, human rights groups (including activists for religious free-
dom), and consumer advocates. Not all of the arguments from these non-governmental
actors can be dismissed as simplistic or selfish. And, of course, there are serious threats
posed by unresolved disputes among the major trading powers (e.g., the Foreign Sales Cor-
poration case, and numerous AD and safeguards cases)1s9
186. Jonquiires, WT0 ReacbesAgreement, supra note 6.
187. For another treatment of developing country issues and the DDA, and the associated politics of trade
liberalization in the United States and Canada see generally Alan S. Alexandroff, Doba: A Very Small Step for
Trade Liberalization (2002) (manuscript on file with author).
188. See Not By Their BootstrapsAlone, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 52. For a new study by the Council on
Foreign Relations on barriers to trade in the Middle East, and their growth-constraining repercussions, see
BERARD HOERmAN & PATRICK MESSERLIN, HARNESSING Tans FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH, IN THE Mm-
DLE EAsT (2002). The study is summarized in Amity Shlaes, Talesfrom the Heart of the Arab Economies, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at 15.
189. For a discussion of these cases, see Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WiT7 Case Review 2000, 18 ARizoNAJ.
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Rather, the point in challenging the conventional wisdom about Doha is that had the
two Challenges been addressed, then Doha might well have produced agreements on more
substantive points than it did. Indeed, insofar as overlap exists between concerns raised by
NGOs, or parts of governments, in some WTO members, and concerns of developing and
Islamic countries, there is reason for confidence in this historical counter-factual claim.
However, that intriguing overlap is for another article.
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